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This study examines the effectiveness of 11 counter-radicalisation policies presented by the 
European Union, Norway, and the Autonomous Region of the Basque Country in Spain. In 
order to do so, two tasks are carried out, where the first is to analyse the overlapping between 
the measures proposed in the policy documents and the contributing factors of the 
radicalisation phenomenon. The second task is to discuss the compatibility of the 
aforementioned measures and the liberties presupposed in a western liberal democracy. The 
study makes use of a conceptualisation of radicalisation based on contemporary scholarly 
literature on the topic together with content analysis, Boolean logic and fuzzy set logic in 
order to accomplish these tasks. The main findings of the study are that out of a potential 
maximum of 1 grade of membership, the policies COM 1, SCRRT 1, EUCTS, SCRRT 2 and 
ColSec have a 0.89 grade of membership in the effectiveness notion and 0.11 in the 
exacerbation notion. Concerning the RAN documents, they have a membership grade of 0.78 
in effectiveness and 0.11 in exacerbation. The PPC has a grade of 0.67 in effectiveness, whilst 
the policy COM 3 has 0.56 in effectiveness and 0.11 in exacerbation. The policies COM 2 
and NorCOM 2 have a grade of membership of 0.45. In addition, NorCOM 2 has 0.11 in 
exacerbation, and finally, NorCOM 1 has a grade of membership of 0.23. Further, the second 
main finding is that the policy documents are context specific. 
 
 Keywords: Counter-radicalisation, radicalisation, extremist, extremism, terrorism, 











































































Lehenik eta behin, nire eskerrik beroenak Linn-Marie, Fanny, Iñaki, Jokin, Maria eta Joseri. 
Zuen laguntza gabe tesi hau ez litzateke orain dena izango. 
 
To my supervisor Marcus Buck, takk for din støtte og mange gode råd. 
 
My sincerest gratitude goes as well to my friend Jamie Craggy, Jill Wolfe from the Writing 






































Table of Content 
Abstract                       iii 
Acknowledgements            v 
Table of Content           vi  
List of Figures                     viii 
List of Tables              ix 
Introduction             1 
Chapter 1             3 
1.1 Aim, Objectives and Scope         4 
1.2 A Note on Methodology         4 
1.2.1 Conceptualising radicalisation       5 
1.2.2 On the European Union, Norway, Spain and   
   their policy papers        5 
1.2.3 A note on policy documents       7 
1.2.4 Liberties presupposed in a western liberal democracy    8 
1.2.5 The importance of discourse       8 
1.2.6 Analysing the overlapping        8 
1.2.7 The researcher´s role        9 
1.3 Thesis Structure        10 
Chapter 2           11 
2.1 The Psychopathological Theory      11 
2.2 Radicalisation as a Process       13 
2.2.1 Borum´s pathway to terrorism     13 
2.2.2 Wiktorowicz´s four stage model     14 
2.2.3 Moghaddam´s staircase allegory     15 
2.2.4 Silber and Bhatt: the New York Police Department model 16 
2.2.5 Sageman´s four prongs model     17 
2.2.6 Nesser´s multiple-path model     18 
2.2.7 Mcauley and Moskalenko´s pyramid of radicalisation  19 
2.3 Explanatory Elements of the Radicalisation Process   19 
2.4 Wrapping up Chapter 2       24 
Chapter 3           25 
3.1 Regarding the Context       25 
vii 
 
3.2 A Look into the Content       26 
3.2.1 Portraying the phenomenon of radicalisation   27 
3.2.2 Pointing towards Islam      31 
3.2.3 On the causes of radicalisation     32 
3.2.4 Counter-radicalisation policies and the notion     
of western liberal democracy    34 
3.3 Wrapping up Chapter 3       35 
Chapter 4           37 
4.1 Policy Recommendations       37 
4.1.1 Policy recommendations in COM 1    37 
4.1.2 Policy recommendations in SCRRT 1,  
EUCTS and SCRRT 2     38 
4.1.3 Policy recommendations in COM 2    40 
4.1.4 Policy recommendations in RAN     41 
4.1.5 Policy recommendations in COM 3    42 
4.1.6 Policy recommendations in NorCOM 1    43 
4.1.7 Policy recommendations in ColSec    43 
4.1.8 Policy recommendations in NorCOM 2    44 
4.1.9 Policy recommendations in PPC     44 
4.1.10 A quick overview       45 
4.2 Coercive Measures and the notion of Western Liberal Democracy 47 
4.3 On the effectiveness of counter-radicalisation policies   52 
4.4 Wrapping up Chapter 4       54 
Chapter 5           55 
5.1 Main Findings         55 
5.2 Challenges and Future Research Proposals     56 
Reference List          59 
Appendices  
Appendix A          69 
Appendix B          70 
Appendix C          72 
Appendix D          75 
Appendix E          85 




List of Figures 
 
Figure 1           28 
Figure 2           29 
Figure 3           31 
Figure 4           33 
Figure 5           34 









































List of Tables 
 
Table 1           38 



















































This study examines the effectiveness of 11 counter-radicalisation policies presented by the 
European Union, Norway, and the Autonomous Region of the Basque Country in Spain. In order to 
carry out this examination, two tasks will be done: firstly, the overlapping between the measures 
proposed in the policy documents and the contributing factors of the radicalisation phenomenon are 
analysed. In order to do so, the study identifies, on the one hand, 158 measures present in these 
policy papers and on the other builds on previous scholarly research on the radicalisation 
phenomenon to itemise a series of nine contributing factors that could potentially push an individual 
forward on the radicalisation path. Secondly, the compatibility of the aforementioned measures and 
the liberties presupposed in a western liberal democracy are discussed. To carry out this second 
task, the study identifies 25 measures which are potentially incompatible with these liberties and 
draws from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU and the constitutions of both countries. 
Effectiveness is therefore examined through a conceptual perspective focusing on the design 
level of the policies. The study acknowledges the importance of discourse as idea generators, 
especially in political realms such as this particular one concerning counter-radicalisation, where 
the majority of society cannot relate such a topic to their personal experiences. In addition, the study 
also recognises that the institutionalisation of ideas tends to vary between organisations and 
countries. Taking this into account, the language used in the policy papers is analysed and the 
variations and evolution in the utilisation of the language is shown. 
The study deems the topic as relevant not only due to major events such as those of Madrid 
in 2004, London in 2005 as well as the more recent happenings of Oslo and Utøya, but also for the 
myriad of small-scale incidents that could potentially divide and polarise society, making group 


















































In September 2005, in the wake of the Madrid, Holland and London attacks, the European 
Commission (2005) forwarded a communication to the European Parliament and the European 
Council concerning terrorist recruitment. The paper outlined the measures to be taken in order to 
address violent radicalisation and the factors and root causes that prompted these processes. 
The gravity of the issue and the relevance of the presented measures were emphasised 
through the linkage of radicalisation and terrorism, and the pronouncement that terrorism has “the 
potential to subvert the very founding principles of the European Union” (European Commission 
[EC], 2005) i.e. human dignity, freedom, equality, and solidarity as defined by the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000). 
Efforts to guarantee these principles became linked to that of fighting radicalisation and in 
this regard new strategies were presented. The European Union Strategy for Combating 
Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, delivered in November 2005, and the inclusion of the 
PREVENT section in the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy of November 2005 were 
examples of this.  
Understanding radicalisation was also emphasised by the European Union (EU) as can be 
seen in paragraph 7 of the aforementioned Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment 
of 2005: “To ensure our responses [to radicalisation] remain effective and appropriate, we will work 
to develop our understanding of the problem [...] we will engage in dialogue with governments 
which have faced this problem, academic experts and Muslim communities in Europe and beyond” 
(Council of the European Union [CEU] 2005a). Knowledge of the processes of radicalisation was 
by then acknowledged as necessary to design effective counter-radicalisation policies. 
Following this precept, in 2006 the EU financed under the Sixth Framework Programme the 
project Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law which focused among other things on 
researching radicalisation, recruitment, the root causes of terrorism, and counter-radicalisation 
strategies. Later on, in 2011 the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) was launched with the 
intention, as stated in its charter, of encouraging “community members, practitioners, law 
enforcement and academics to share and discuss best practice in spotting and addressing 
radicalisation and recruitment leading to acts of terrorism” (p. 1)
1
. 
The EU has defined itself as a supporter of the member states in addressing radicalisation 
processes and has put the emphasis on the notion that counter-radicalisation policies are ultimately 
the responsibility of the member states (CEU 2005a; EC, 2010). This has resulted in multiple and 
different national strategies with a more or less developed preventive sections (Transnational 
                                                 
1 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/docs/ran_charter_en.pdf (29/11/2013) 
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1.1 Aim, Objectives and Scope 
This study seeks to examine the counter-radicalisation initiatives, strategies and policies proposed 
by the European Union and the governments of Norway and the Autonomous Region of the Basque 
Country in Spain in order to show to what extent these policies can be considered effective.  
A definitive statement about the effectiveness of preventive policies can be challenging and 
controversial. Therefore part of the results of this project will be debatable. In an attempt to bypass 
this difficulty, the following premise is adopted: for a counter-radicalisation policy to be effective it 
has to address the contributing factors of the radicalisation processes. The author understands that 
when a policy has design defects or incoherencies (the measures do not address the diagnosed 
causes), the output of these policies will not be positive and therefore they will not be deemed 
effective. At the same time, maintaining the liberties presupposed in a western liberal democracy is 
vital when designing context specific and effective preventative policies. Consequently the analysis 
of a policy's effectiveness can be achieved by responding to these questions: 
- To what extent do the counter-radicalisation policies presented in the EU, Norway and the 
Autonomous Region of the Basque Country address the contributing factors of the 
radicalisation process? 
- To what extent do the counter-radicalisation policies presented in the EU, Norway and the 
Autonomous Region of the Basque Country guarantee the liberties surmised in a western 
liberal democracy? 
This project sets its focus exclusively on counter-radicalisation policies as defined by the 
United Nations Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism: “A package of social, political, 
legal, educational, and economic programmes specifically designed to deter disaffected (and 
possibly already radicalised) individuals from crossing the line and becoming terrorists” (United 
Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, 2008, p. 2). De-radicalisation policies 
aimed at already radicalised people and disengagement initiatives aimed at people who have already 
been recruited will not be considered. 
 
1.2 A Note on the Methodology 
The methodology used to fulfil the aims and objectives of this study will be comparative in nature. 
For this comparison to be possible three intermediate steps are necessary: first, the 
                                                 
2 The TTSRL  deliverable, Mapping Counterterrorism: A Categorization of Policies and the Promise of Empirically-Based, Systematic Comparison, 




conceptualisation of the radicalisation process and the factorisation of the causes behind this 
phenomenon has to be conducted. Second, the counter-radicalisation policies presented at the 
European, Norwegian, and Basque level have to be compiled and analysed in order to be able to 
discern the measures they propose. And, third, the possibility of some measures that do not 
guarantee the liberties surmised in a western liberal democracy will be discussed. 
 
1.2.1 Conceptualising radicalisation. Radicalisation is a complex phenomenon and many 
reasons, theories, and models have been presented to explain it (see Victoroff, 2005).  There is no 
one generally accepted definition or conceptualisation, and debate on this matter is still one of the 
main topics in scholarly articles, official documents, and reports. It is for this reason that in order to 
conceptualise this phenomenon the study will draw upon previous scholarly research on the subject 
with the aim of presenting a compilation of the contributing factors proposed by contemporary 
social scientists. 
 
1.2.2 On the European Union, Norway, the Autonomous region of the Basque Country 
and their policy papers. The original idea behind the project was to analyse the counter-
radicalisation policies proposed by the European Union. However, because final responsibility for 
addressing the radicalisation phenomenon lies with individual states, the inclusion of two states was 
considered. The possibility of analysing the policies proposed by two countries with different levels 
of EU integration was chosen to provide a more complete vision of contemporary counter-
radicalisation policies in Europe.   
According to Alexander George and Andrew Bennett (2005) and Jason Seawright and John 
Gerring (2008), case selection should not only be guided by personal interest, availability of data, or 
pragmatic considerations. The relevance, representativeness, control and appropriate variation 
required by the research purpose needs to be taken into account (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 83; 
Seawright & Gerring, 2008, p. 295). In this vein, Norway and Spain were chosen for various 
reasons: first they share some similarities that makes comparisons possible without losing 
connotative precision, i.e. European countries, consolidated liberal democracies, biggest terrorist 
attacks on European soil, but at the same time they have divergences, other than their level of 
integration, that could possibly influence the way counter-radicalisation is perceived and therefore 
conducted. Among these, one could note the previous existence of terrorist groups in Spain (ETA, 
GRAPO), the different motivations behind the events of Utøya and Madrid, or the different 
economic situation among others. 
Despite the initial idea to analyse the counter-radicalisation policies of both countries, the 
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lack of non-classified official strategies or white papers on counter-radicalisation in Spain
3
 led to 
two possible courses of action: the first being to select a different country with a known policy 
addressing radicalisation, and the second, to look for policies in other realms that could be 
comparable to the counter-radicalisation initiatives proposed by the EU and Norway.  
This second option entailed bringing a new layer of complexity. Due to the territorial 
organisation of Spain many competencies are transferred to the regional levels and therefore these 
strategies could also exist in a sub-national sphere. Looking at policies at the sub-national level 
would elevate the project up the abstraction ladder, but at the same time conducting the analysis at 
three levels, namely the supra-national (EU), the national (Norway), and the sub-national (the 
Autonomous Region of the Basque Country) would, once again, offer a wider overview of current 
initiatives in Europe. Since offering a wide vision of contemporary counter-radicalisation policies in 
Europe was one of the driving premises of the study, this second option was favoured. 
The selection of the policy documents responds greatly to the lack of transparency regarding 
counter-radicalisation initiatives. In this matter, Statewatch (2013)
4
, a working group led by the 
University of Durham that conducted an EU-funded research project on the EU’s counter-terrorism 
legislation, mentions that despite the opposition of the Swedish presidency when the Revised EU 
Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism was presented “all of the 
specific actions were redacted from the publicly available text. All of the other key documents 
relating to the EU’s radicalisation and recruitment strategy received the same treatment” (p. 10). It 
also emphasises that due to the lack of transparency “it is impossible [for the public and civil 
society] to even attempt to ascertain its legitimacy or effectiveness or otherwise play any part in the 
democratic process” (p. 10). 
In an attempt to overcome this difficulty the study made use of all the documents that could 
be accessed, including the available action plans and communications in order to build an image of 
counter-radicalisation measures that is as complete as possible.  
The result of the search is presented in the following list: 
Policy papers of the European Union 
1. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
concerning terrorist recruitment – Addressing the factors contributing to violent 
radicalisation (21 September 2005) 
2. The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism 
(24 November 2005) 
3. The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy (30 November 2005) 
                                                 
3 http://www.osce.org/es/fsc/100719?download=true (25/05/14) 
4 http://www.statewatch.org/news/2013/dec/SECILE-sw-summary.pdf (25/05/14) 
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4. Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism (14 
November 2008) 
5. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – The 
EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe (22 
November 2010) 
6. Proposed Policy Recommendations from the RAN Working Groups (December 2012) 
7. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Preventing 
Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU´s Response (15 
January 2014) 
Policy papers of Norway 
1. Transforming Terrorists: International Efforts to Address Violent Extremism (3 May 2011) 
2. Collective security – a shared responsibility Action plan to prevent radicalization and 
violent extremism (9 May 2011) 
3. Ny strategi for å forebygge og bekjempe radikalisering (4 November 2013). 
Policy paper of the Autonomous Region of the Basque Country: 
1. Plan de Paz y Convivencia 2013-16 (November 2013) 
Each of these documents is an official policy paper available on the web pages of the 
organisations that present them. The authenticity of the documents is not in question and therefore 
will be deemed as valid to conduct this study.  
 
1.2.3 A note on policy documents. Although there is a lack of one unified definition of 
what public policy is (Fernández, 2006, p. 499) and it has been defined as widely as “[…] whatever 
governments choose to do or not to do (Dye, 1972, cited by Knoepfel, Larrue, Varone & Hill 2011, 
p. 23), there is, however, a requirement that co-occurs through most of the definitions: the presence 
of a governmental authority (Fernández, 2006, p. 499). This conception of the necessity of 
involvement of a governmental authority can be problematic for the inclusion of the aforementioned 
Proposed Policy Recommendations from the RAN Working Groups, the most extensive and 
explanatory set of documents at the European level regarding counter-radicalisation measures. 
Understanding that the elimination of the RAN documents from the analysis would make it difficult 
to acquire a good picture of the proposed counter-radicalisation measures at the EU level, the 
definition of public policy adopted in this study is that proposed by Peter Knoepfel, Corinne Larrue, 
Frédéric Varone and Michael Hill (2011) that defines public policy as “a series of intentionally 
coherent decisions or activities taken or carried out by different public – and sometimes – private 
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actors, whose resources, institutional links and interest vary, with a view to resolving in a targeted 
manner a problem that is politically defined as collective […]” (p. 24). This would de facto enable 
the classification of the RAN documents as public policy documents.  
 
1.2.4 Liberties presupposed in a western liberal democracy. Defining what are the 
presupposed liberties of a western liberal democracy could have been conducted in a way similar to 
the one used for the conceptualisation of radicalisation. However, the author understands that unlike 
radicalisation, liberties are coded and can be found, inter alia, in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the EU 
(CFREU) and the constitutions of both countries.  
Although the UNDHR is not directly binding on the states, or supra-national entities for that 
matter, it could be said that it has long been regarded as customary international law (Mendel & 
Salomon 2011, p. 9). The ICCPR and the ECHR, however, are legally binding for the countries that 
have ratified them (Norway and Spain included)
5
. In addition, CFREU has been legally binding 
since December the 1
st
 2009 for the institutions of the European Union. 
 
1.2.5 The importance of discourse. Language has the power to make meaning of things 
and this, in turn, influences how people think and act towards that specific thing (Mehan, 1997, p. 
250). In a political realm such as this particular one, where the majority of society cannot relate it to 
their personal experiences, the discourse through which the topic is presented to society becomes 
the only link between the two.  
The study also recognises that the institutionalisation of ideas tends to vary between 
organisations and countries, and thus, taking this into account, it analyses the language used through 
the policy papers and shows the variations and evolution in the language. 
 
1.2.6 Analysing the overlapping. In order to discern if the selected counter-radicalisation 
policies address the contributing factors of the radicalisation process, the overlapping between these 
factors and the proposed measures will be analysed. 
This analysis will be accomplished in three steps: the first will make use of Boolean logic to 
define what contributing factors are addressed by what proposed measures, e.g. if measure X¹ of a 
policy paper addresses the contributing factor Z¹, but not Z², then measure X¹ will be given the 
value (1) for Z¹ and (0) for Z². The repetition of this process with every measure of the 11 policy 
                                                 




papers will produce a truth table that will enable the next step to be conducted. 
The second step will use fuzzy set logic to express the degree of membership of the policy 
within the previously defined effectiveness conception. The effectiveness conception in this study 
breaks with the classical concepts that present membership in a dichotomous fashion where a 
variable is a member when it meets all the pre-defined characteristics or not a member if it fails to 
meet one or more (Marsteintredet 2007, p. 2). The study will consider effectiveness as a radial 
concept that defines the characteristics of a full member prototype and allows categorising the rest 
of the variables in regards to the similarities shared with that prototype (Collier & Mahon, 1993, p. 
848; Marsteintredet 2007, p. 5). 
When fuzzy set scores and radial concepts are used, the possibility of an arbitrary 
membership ascription to the variables, as well as the difficulties that this arbitrariness may pose for 
the replicability of the membership value ascription process in subsequent studies, have to be taken 
into account. 
In order to avoid this valid critique (Marsteintredet 2007, p. 10), the process of analysis and 
the ascription of membership values will be made as transparent as possible. In this manner, if the 
truth table shows that a policy paper overlaps with all the contributing factors of the radicalisation 
phenomenon the value (1) will be ascribed to it, if in turn it fails to overlap with all the factors the 
value (0) will be ascribed. In the case that it overlaps with part of the factors a value of (>0 and <1) 
will be ascribed in relation to the occurrence of the overlapping, i.e. if a policy paper overlaps with 
60 % of the contributing factors through the measures it presents then the membership will be 0.6, if 
in turn it overlaps with 30 % then the membership grade will be 0.3.  
The third step will serve to calibrate the membership degrees of the policy papers within the 
effectiveness notion, taking into account the possibility that jeopardising the standards of the 
liberties presupposed in a western liberal democracy could have in the membership degrees 
ascribed in the previous stage. 
 
1.2.7 The researcher´s role. Due to the nature of the topic, a few words are necessary on 
the matter of reflexivity. Some researchers have claimed (see for example Brannan, Esler & Anders 
Strindberg, 2001; Silke, 2010) that terrorism studies has approached its field of study and the 
subject of research antagonistically, with the predisposition to defeat it and not to understand it 
(Brannan et al., 2001, p. 4). This section does not pretend to investigate the validity of this claim, 
but it should serve as an exploration and a reminder of where I stand on the subject of this thesis. 
When doing research, social scientists have to make a reflective exercise to discover their 
position as a person and as a researcher in relation to the context and vice versa. Through this 
process of self-inquiry and personal conversation a researcher will be able to identify the lenses 
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through which the research has been conducted, and the possible biases she/he might have incurred 
(King & Horrocks, 2010, p. 126, 127; Longhofer, Floersch & Hoy 2013, p. 140). 
Following this precept I have to agree with Jongman and Schmid (1988) that the role of the 
researcher is “not to fight the terrorist fire; rather than a firefighter he should be a student of 
combustion” (as cited in Brannan et al., 2001, p. 8). Therefore, regardless of the implications, 
connotations and nature of the phenomenon of radicalisation and terrorism, this thesis will be 
conducted from an impartial position, and will take Mark Jürgensmeyer´s (2000) words as a guiding 
principle: “Although it is not my purpose to be sympathetic to people who have done terrible things, 
I do want to understand them and their world views” (p. 7). 
 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is divided in five chapters. The first chapter serves as an introduction and 
contextualisation of the project, and as an explanation on how the research will be conducted. In 
chapter two a literature review on radicalisation is conducted and the contributing factors of this 
phenomenon are itemised. In chapter three the different counter-radicalisation policies are presented 
and operationalised. Chapter four is dedicated to the analysis of overlapping between the 




The narratives developed by the media about “home-grown” terrorism after the assassination of the 
Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh in 2004, and the terrorist attacks in London in 2005 brought the 
term “radicalisation” into lay discourse. Later, the implementation of counter-radicalisation policies 
by governments institutionalised the term (Githens-Mazer & Lambert, 2010, p. 889; Sedgwick, 
2010, p. 480; TTSRL, 2008b, p. 5). But what is radicalisation? 
Due to the various meanings, nuances and connotations the term has, when encountering this 
word one needs to contextualise it. Then, the question of how or why it happens can be answered. 
The European Commission defines radicalisation as “the phenomenon of people embracing 
opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism” (EC, 2005, p. 1; TTSRL, 2008b, p. 
11). In addition, the same document acknowledges that not all individuals in contact with radicals 
end up radicalised, that not all radical groups end up committing terrorist acts and that even though 
illegitimate methods are used the goals being pursued could be legitimate (EC, 2005, p. 4). 
 From this definition one could draw that any opinions, views and ideas could serve as a 
vehicle towards terrorism (King & Taylor, 2011, p. 603). In this chapter, however, the focus will be 
on second and third generation Muslim immigrants in Europe. 
This chapter will take the reader through some proposed explanations for the radicalisation 
phenomenon. The psychopathological theory will first be presented as an example of a theory that 
denies the understanding of radicalisation as a process (section 2.1). In opposition to the 
psychopathological theory, the models proposed by Randy Borum (2003), Quintan Wiktorowicz 
(2004), Fathali Moghaddam (2005), Silber and Bhatt (2007), Marc Sageman (2008) and Petter 
Nesser (2010) as well as Clark Mcauley and Sophia Moskalenko (2008) will be explored as 
illustrations of radicalisation understood as a process (section 2.2). Although these models present 
significant differences in the conceptualisations of the phenomenon, they also share certain 
commonalities regarding the contributing factors of radicalisation, and are in consonance with the 
frameworks explaining radicalisation proposed by several other authors. The last part of the current 
chapter (section 2.3) will examine these shared commonalities and itemise the contributing factors 
of radicalisation. 
 
2.1 The Psychopathological Theory 
Terrorists are often labelled indiscriminately as mentally sick, evil, or as not normal human beings. 
This has been, and in some circles still is, the explanation why some individuals become involved 
in terrorism (Sageman, 2008, p. 15; Sedgwick, 2010, p. 480). 
The psychopathological theory is often used as the validation of this viewpoint on terrorism. 
From the 1980´s, as with Jerrold Post (1984), and now into the 21
st
 century, e.g. Michel Gottschalk 
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and Simon Gottschalk (2004), scholars have argued that terrorists have pathological personality 
defects that drag individuals towards the “terrorist vocation”. In this regard, feelings of hostility 
against parents, childhood humiliating experiences, narcissism, low self-esteem, antisocial disorders 
or pathological hatred have been proposed as causes for becoming a terrorist (Brannan et al., 2001, 
p. 6; Gottschalk and Gottschalk, 2004, p. 50; Martens 2004, p. 52; Post, 1990, p. 25; Ruby 2002, p. 
16, 17). At this moment, however, there is no research that shows there is a higher rate of mental 
illness among terrorists than within the rest of society (Moghaddam, 2005, p. 161; Ruby, 2002, p. 
23; Sageman, 2008, p. 17; Silke, 2008, p. 103; Taylor & Horgan, 2006, p. 585; Victoroff 2005, p. 
12-13; Weatherson & Moran, 2003, p. 700-701).  
The definition of psychopathology that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders 5 (DSM-5), published by the American Psychiatric Association (2013), presents, would 
be most appropriate to offer a contemporary understanding of the term. Thus, psychopathology 
should be understood in the following way: 
A mental disorder is a syndrome characterized by clinically significant disturbance in an individual’s cognition, 
emotion regulation, or behaviour that reflects a dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or developmental 
processes underlying mental processes. [...]. An expectable or culturally approved response to a common 
stressor or loss, such as the death of a loved one, is not a mental disorder. Socially deviant behaviour (e.g., 
political, religious, or sexual) and conflicts that are primarily between the individual and society are not mental 
disorders unless the deviance or conflict result from a dysfunction in the individual, as described above 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 20). 
From this definition one could draw the conclusion that participation in terrorism cannot be 
considered a mental disorder per se since socially deviant behaviours and conflicts that are 
primarily between the individual and the society is not to be regarded as such. Nevertheless, it is 
possible, as some researchers have pointed out, that individuals with psychopathological traits are 
involved in terrorist activities (Ruby, 2002, p. 22; Silke, 2008, p. 104; Victoroff, 2005, p. 12, 17; 
Weatherson and Moran, 2003, p. 701).  
Willhelm Martens (2004) works on this last idea, when pointing out that “many terrorists 
show some antisocial and (comorbid) narcissistic traits” (p. 52). Gottschalk and Gottschalk´s (2004) 
research also supports this, noting that terrorists, “regardless of their gender, political, religious or 
ethnic affiliation”, have higher scores on depression or paranoia than the control group they refer to 
(p. 42).  
Nevertheless, even if this were the case, it still would not be proof enough to support the 
claim that terrorists have mental disorders prior to initiating the terrorist activity, and neither would 
it prove the causality of it as the psychopathological theory claims. Charles Ruby (2002) points out 
that the particular lifestyles of individuals who are part of a terrorist organisation might prompt the 
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development of psychological idiosyncrasies that could later develop into pathologies, as defined by 
the DSM-5 (p. 23). He carries on, however, to say that other lifestyles derived from or related to 
activities such as policing or military engagement, could also generate these pathologies, e.g. Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder, anxiety or desensitisation (Ruby, 2002, p. 23-24; Weatherson and Moran, 
2003, p. 702, 704). 
Sageman (2008) offers significant insights into the use and abuse of the psychopathological 
theory. He defines it as a reaction known in social psychology as the fundamental error of 
attribution, which points to a human predisposition to attribute other people´s behaviour to their 
personal qualities and proclivity, while justifying one´s own behaviour with situational factors (p. 
18; Silke, 2008, p. 104). Andrew Silke (2008) complements Sageman´s idea by bringing an 
illustrative example from the World War II period: 
[...] 16 of these Nazi leaders were assessed by an Allied psychologist. The psychologist concluded that their 
scores were those of violent, power hungry, obsessed [...] Years later, however, the same Nazi scores were 
inserted among a selection of scores from a group of average Americans. This mix was given to a panel of 
experts who failed entirely to identify anything unusual about the Nazi leaders, and instead concluded that all 
of the scores reflected stable and healthy personalities (p. 103-104). 
When faced with episodes of violence or extreme behaviour like that of the Nazis or 
terrorists, and in order to protect one´s understanding of what ordinary people are and how they act, 
one tends to find explanations that draw clear boundaries between the terrorists in this case and the 
rest of society (Sageman, 2008, p. 15). These explanations create an “us” and “them” discourse that 
simplifies a very complex phenomenon. 
To sum up, lack of proof validating the causality of psychopathologies condemns this theory 
to be dismissed or even forgotten. Jeff Victoroff (2005) mentions that this, however, does not mean 
psychological, motivational or emotional processes do not occur on the individual level during 
radicalisation, and thus, personal factors should not be obviated from a radicalisation analysis (p. 
17). In addition, the simplification of the phenomenon could potentially be regarded as an obstacle 
to the process of implementing appropriate antiterrorism and counter-radicalisation policies 
(Korteweg, Gohel, Heisbourg, Ranstorp & De Wijk, 2010, p. 29-30). 
 
2.2 Radicalisation as a Process 
2.2.1 Borum’s pathway to terrorism. Although Borum (2003) does not mention 
radicalisation specifically in his model, nor limit the model to a specific group of people. He 
explains that the process of reaching the point where any individual or group justifies terrorism 
occurs in four separate stages. The process begins with an individual or group “framing some 
unsatisfying event or condition as unjust” (p. 7). An injustice, real or perceived which can be as 
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diverse as economic deprivation, poor living conditions or government imposed restrictions on 
liberties, is then the starting point of the radicalisation process (Borum, 2003, p. 7; King & Taylor, 
2011, p. 604). 
The second stage of the model is reached when the individual or group puts the 
aforementioned injustice in perspective with the situation of a relevant other and deems it unfair and 
illegitimate (Borum, 2003, p. 8; King & Taylor, 2011, p. 604).  
The third stage is reached when the individual or group holds another person or group 
responsible for their unjust and unfair situation. At this point a narrative is developed in which 
blame is attributed to a person or an out-group is identified as a target while the in-group is depicted 
as a victim (Borum, 2003, p. 8; King & Taylor, 2011, p. 604). The fourth and final stage is reached 
when the deprived individual or group claims “good people would not intentionally inflict adverse 
conditions on others” (Borum, 2003, p. 8). It is at this point where the distancing between the in-
group and the out-group peaks, and de-humanisation can occur, making violent responses easier to 
conduct and justify (Borum, 2003, p. 8; King & Taylor 2011, p. 604).  
Summing up, Borum’s (2003) model discerns injustices (such as economic deprivation, poor 
living conditions and restrictions on liberties) as important factors in radicalisation. In addition, it 
could be argued that the conception of relative deprivation and group relative deprivation is 
introduced in the second stage and with it, identity becomes visible as well. The two last stages 
introduce narrative as a contributing factor.  
 
2.2.2 Wiktorowicz’s four stage model. Wiktorowicz (2004), in a similar way to Borum 
(2003), does not mention radicalisation per se, nevertheless he presents the journey which an 
individual undergoes before joining an extremist organisation as involving an “extensive 
socialization process that includes exposure to movement ideas, debates and deliberation, and even 
experimentation with alternative groups” (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p. 1), and proposes a four phase 
model to explain it. 
The first phase is that of the cognitive opening, where, due to a personal crisis or some 
triggering event such as blocked mobility, racism or political discrimination, ideas that the 
individual would not have considered previously begin to have a place in her/his imagination. This 
personal crisis can also be generated by outreach activism, through debate and interaction, 
sponsored by an organisation (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p. 8).  
The second phase is that of religious seeking and frame alignment. In cases where religion is 
part of the identity of the individual or the milieu, the individual may resort to religion in order to 
make sense of their surroundings. This could happen in two different ways: in the first, the 
individual will start the search by herself/himself and will shop around in a “religious marketplace 
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of ideas” (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p. 9); the second way, more likely to happen when the cognitive 
opening has occurred in relation to outreach activism, a group will guide the individual through the 
market (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p. 9). When the frame presented by a religious group resonates with the 
experiences of the individual, frame alignment is possible and therefore she/he might accept the 
group´s ideas as their own (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p. 8-10).  
The final phases are socialisation and joining. Through the socialisation process the 
individual meets other members, new social networks are created and a new identity revolving 
around the group membership is constructed. In the joining phase the individual becomes a full 
member of the group (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p. 10). 
In brief, Wiktorowicz (2004) introduces in the first phase injustices (such as blocked 
mobility, racism or political discrimination) and social networks (present in the rest of the phases) 
as contributing factors in the radicalisation process. It could be argued that narrative is introduced as 
another factor in the second phase, while the explanation of the final phases introduces identity-
related factors in regards to in-group and out-group identification construction and reconstruction. 
 
2.2.3 Moghaddam’s staircase allegory. In a similar fashion to the previously presented 
models, Moghaddam (2005) does not mention radicalisation, but presents a five step staircase 
allegory model ranging from the base were all the population is located towards the apex where a 
terrorist action is committed. In each step of the staircase, and in response to specific factors, the 
individual decides if she/he is to climb to the next step or remain where they are (p.161; King & 
Taylor, 2011, p. 606). 
The model presents feelings of injustice, such as economic or political conditions, inequality 
or threats to identity, and relative deprivation, or fraternal relative deprivation more specifically 
(group relative deprivation), as the seminal factors prompting radicalisation (Moghaddam, 2005, p. 
162-164; King & Taylor, 2011, p. 606). It is in reaction to those feelings that the individual climbs 
to the first floor seeking for a solution. 
In the first step, Moghaddam (2005) identifies factors that could influence the individual up 
the ladder as the perception of social mobility and procedural justice, or the decision-making 
process, to improve their situation. The key question in this first floor is “whether there are doors 
that could be opened by talented persons motivated to make progress up the societal hierarchy” (p. 
163). If legitimate possibilities for addressing their initial grievances exist, the chances of the 
individual climbing to the next floor are reduced (Moghaddam, 2005, p. 163; King & Taylor 2011, 
p. 606). 
The second step is similar to Borum’s (2003) third stage. It is characterised by the 
displacement of aggression towards a selected enemy, nurtured by an “us” versus “them” narrative 
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(Moghaddam, 2005, p. 162, 164). From here, the jump to the next step is taken by those 
“individuals who develop a readiness to physically displace aggression and [...] actively seek to do 
so eventually leave the second floor and climb” (Moghaddam, 2005, p. 164). 
On the third step (the last one before formally joining a terrorist organisation), individuals 
find like-minded people who share their grievances. Mutual radicalisation commences, terrorist 
narratives and the distance between the group and the other is maximised in this stage. In the 
subsequent two floors the individual is formally a member of a terrorist organisation where 
radicalisation continues (Moghaddam, 2005, p. 165; King & Taylor, 2011, p. 606). 
Summing up, Moghaddam (2005) introduces as part of the ground floor, feelings of injustice 
produced by economic and political conditions, inequality, threats to identity, and fraternal relative 
deprivation among others as seminal factors contributing to the radicalisation process. In the second 
step, social stagnation and trust in procedural justice are stressed as possible instigators to take the 
individual to the next step. In the second step, narrative and social categorisation are presented as 
factors that could prompt an individual to jump to the next level. In the third step, narrative and 
identity continue to be present, but social networks are the contributing factor that is stressed. 
 
2.2.4 Silber and Bhatt: the New York Police Department model. The New York Police 
Department Model is the first of the analysed models using radicalisation as an independent concept 
and it is divided into four different stages. Ideology is one of the clear focuses of this model as it is 
“the driver that motivates young men and women, born or living in the West, to carry out 
autonomous jihad” (Silber & Bhatt, 2007, p. 6). 
The first stage, similar to Moghaddam’s (2005) ground floor, is that of pre-radicalisation. 
According to Silber and Bhatt (2007) this stage represents the “life situation before they were 
exposed to and adopted jihadi-salafi Islam as their own ideology” (p. 6).  
The radicalisation process begins in the second stage, named self-identification. It is in this 
stage where due to factors such as blocked mobility, alienation, discrimination, international 
conflicts involving Muslims or the death of relative, a personal crisis arises and the individual turns 
to Islam in search for answers. It is during this search that the individual might stumble upon the 
jihadi-salafi ideology. A new identity founded in the jihadi-salafi narrative begins to appear and the 
individual seeks likeminded people in order to fulfil her/his needs of affiliation (Silber & Bhatt, 
2007, p. 6-7; King & Taylor, 2011, p. 607). 
The third stage, indoctrination, is characterised by the individual wholly adopting the 
aforementioned narrative as his/her own. What previously was a religious matter becomes political, 
and world events are interpreted through the lenses of the adopted narrative. Silber and Bhatt (2007) 
stress that in this stage it is the group that becomes the driver of the radicalisation process as 
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opposed to the second stage (p. 7; King & Taylor 2011, p. 607). 
During the final stage, jihadisation, individuals become committed to waging jihad and will 
start operational planning (p. 7; King & Taylor, 2011, p. 607). 
To sum up, Silber and Bhatt (2007) point towards a personal crisis caused by blocked 
mobility, alienation, discrimination, and international conflicts, among other possible reasons, as the 
initial point of radicalisation, and this narrative then becomes the driving force behind further 
radicalisation. The third stage continues to point at the narrative factor. However, at this stage, 
social networks are stressed. After this stage the individual will begin planning their “autonomous 
jihad”. 
 
2.2.5 Sageman’s four-prong model. Sageman (2008) proposes a model where the 
radicalisation process is not necessarily conceived as a linear progressive pathway as in the 
previously presented models, but as a process influenced by four different dimensions that can 
appear at different times, develop at different speeds and relate to each other without having to 
follow a specific order (p. 72; King & Taylor, 2011, p. 605). A sense of moral, personal resonance, 
the “single narrative” and socialisation are identified as those four prongs. 
Sageman (2008) explains that moral outrage has motivational effects on the radicalisation 
processes. Moral outrage arises when physical injustice, such as killing, injury, rape, arrest, or 
foreign intervention is perceived as a moral violation by an individual (p. 72-73; King & Taylor, 
2011, p. 608). 
The “single narrative” refers to the ideological construct based on the idea that Islam is 
under attack. This narrative offers a frame to interpret events in the world. Through this, the 
invasion of Iraq, the Israel-Palestine conflict, or the killing of a child are connected and understood 
as an organised campaign by the West to eliminate Islam (Atran, 2008, p. 7; King & Taylor 2011, p. 
608; Sageman, 2008, p. 81-82).  
Through the prong of personal experience, Sageman (2008) supports the idea of the 
individual being an active actor in her/his own radicalisation process. Therefore, it is her/him who 
has to relate the moral outrage or the “single narrative” to her/his own personal experience (p. 75, 
83) and a parallel is set between images coming from foreign countries, narratives explaining world 
dynamics, and local grievances such as relative deprivation, discrimination and lack of 
opportunities (Sageman, 2008, p. 83-84, 100, 101; King & Taylor, 2008, p. 608). 
Sageman (2008) identifies socialisation through networks as the fourth prong and 
emphasises that many studies have shown the role that kinship relations and friendship bonds have 
played in the radicalisation phenomenon and the joining of terrorist groups (p. 66-67, 84-86). When 
an individual joins a group of like-minded people, ones ideas might get validated by another and a 
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third one could end up endorsing them as well (Sageman, 2008, p. 84; King & Taylor, 2011, p. 608).  
In brief, Sageman (2008) presents the sense of moral outrage provoked by events such as the 
invasion of Iraq as the first prong. The second would be related to the “single narrative” where 
among other things western foreign policy is perceived as attempting to eliminate Islam. The 
individual’s personal experience with discrimination, lack of opportunities and relative deprivation 
is presented as the third prong, and finally the fourth prong is identified as the influence of 
networks. 
 
2.2.6 Nesser’s multiple-path model. Nesser (2010) mentions that the seminal contributing 
causes to radicalisation are related to personal problems, social grievances and deprivation, and 
identity related factors, among others. However, he emphasises that different people show different 
motivations as well as different radicalisation paths (p. 87). Inspired by the typologies of right-wing 
extremists, he distinguishes four main ideal categories of radicalised “cell members”: entrepreneurs, 
protégés, misfits and drifters (Nesser, 2010, p. 88, 92-94).  
The first two archetypes (who hold different positions within the cell) undergo a gradual 
radicalisation process “through intellectual processes, activism, idealism and a call for social and 
political justice”. In a similar way to Sageman (2008), Nesser (2010) argues that entrepreneurs and 
protégés actively direct their radicalisation process (p. 93, 108). The main factors initiating the 
radicalisation of these two archetypes are frustration with political affairs, both locally and 
internationally, especially in relation to “fellow” Muslims such as those of Chechnya and Iraq, the 
perception of not being able to influence decision making by legal means and the influence of 
action-oriented religious narratives (Nesser, 2010, p. 88, 92-93; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010, p. 806).  
At a different level are the drifters and misfits. Nesser (2010) emphasises that these 
individuals are not as ideologically committed as the entrepreneurs and protégés. While the driving 
motives for the misfits to join a radical group are, in many cases, a troublesome past or personal 
problems, the drifter joins due to their commitment to specific social networks and to a lesser extent 
due to “youth rebellion, search for adventure and lack of viable options” (p. 93-95; Dalgaard-
Nielsen, 2010, p. 806-807). 
To sum up, Nesser (2008) mentions personal problems, social grievances and deprivation 
and identity related factors as overarching causes of the radicalisation process. However, he points 
towards political frustration especially in relation to those matters that affect fellow Muslims, i.e. 
Chechnya and Iraq among others, the perception of not being able to influence decision making, 
and narrative as contributing factors for entrepreneurs and protégés; and personal problems, 




2.2.7 McCauley and Moskalenko’s pyramid radicalisation. McCauley and Moskalenko 
(2008) picture the process of radicalisation as a pyramid where the section of society that supports 
and shares the beliefs and feelings of the terrorists is at the base and terrorists themselves are on the 
apex. The authors distinguish between individual, group and mass radicalisation and, accordingly, 
identify different pathways. In addition, the authors stress that the pathway of the radicalisation 
process varies from individual to individual (p. 417-18, 429). Following the path marked by the 
previous model, this section will focus on the individual’s radicalisation process and not, therefore, 
the pathways proposed for groups and masses. 
According to McCauley and Moskalenko (2008)an individual does not suddenly move from 
the base of the pyramid to the apex, on the contrary, they argue that a sympathiser will radicalise in 
a slow and gradual manner by the means of four different mechanisms, namely personal 
victimisation, political grievances, self-persuasion and personal connections on the individual level 
(p. 418, 419). 
Personal victimisation is a mechanism related to negative personal experience at the 
individual level, such as physical violence and unjust treatment by the authorities or the government 
(McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, p. 418). McCauley and Moskalenko (2008), however, stress that 
this mechanism is more likely to push the individual up in the pyramid if it is perceived as a 
grievance of the individual’s reference group (p. 419). In a similar way and relatively intertwined, 
the second mechanism responds to the individual's perception of political trends or events 
(McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008, p. 419). Once the individual has started the radicalisation 
process the third mechanism proposes self-justification through the individual's own actions. This 
justification occurs, according to the authors, as an “effort to reduce inconsistencies between 
positive self-image and bad behaviour” (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, p. 420). Finally, the 
fourth mechanism builds on the influence of social networks and friendship bonds (McCauley & 
Moskalenko, 2008, p. 420-21). 
Summing up, McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) present negative personal experiences, 
such as physical violence and unjust treatment, as contributing factor to the radicalisation process. 
They emphasise that when these personal grievances are linked to the grievances of the individual’s 
identity group the chances of escalating through the pyramid will increase. In addition, political 
grievances, social networks and friendship bonds are mentioned as additional factors. 
 
2.3 Explanatory Elements of the Radicalisation Process  
In the models presented many factors are proposed as possible instigators of the radicalisation 
process. Identity-related issues are proposed by Borum (2003), Wiktorowicz (2004), Moghaddam 
(2005), Silber and Bhatt (2007), Nesser (2010), McCauley and Moskalenko (2008). Lack of 
20 
 
opportunities, such as poor living conditions or blocked social mobility is also emphasised by 
Borum (2003), Wiktorowicz (2004), Moghaddam (2005), Silber and Bhatt (2007), Sageman (2008) 
and Nesser (2010). Discrimination-related issues are mentioned by Wiktorowicz (2004), Silber and 
Bhatt (2007), Sageman (2008), Nesser (2010) and McCauley and Moskalenko (2008). Lack of trust 
in the political system derived from not being able to influence decision making or unjust treatment 
by authorities is mentioned by Borum (2003), Wiktorowicz (2004), Moghaddam (2005), Nesser 
(2010) and McCauley and Moskalenko (2008). Relative deprivation and more specifically group 
relative deprivation is mentioned by Borum (2003), Moghaddam (2005) and Sageman (2008). 
Further, the influence of narratives is pointed by Borum (2003), Wiktorowicz (2004), Moghaddam 
(2005), Sageman (2008) and Nesser (2010). Social networks, in turn, are mentioned by 
Wiktorowicz (2004), Moghaddam (2005), Silber and Bhatt (2007), Sageman (2008), Nesser (2010) 
and McCauley and Moskalenko (2008). Finally, the international sphere and the importance of 
foreign policy and interventions are emphasised by Silber and Bhatt (2007), Sageman (2008) and 
Nesser (2010). 
The social identity theory, developed through the 1970´s by Henry Tajfel and John Turner, 
proposes that social identities are part of the conceptualisation of the self-made by an individual that 
derives from the perceived membership of a group. In other words, an individual builds his own 
conception of the self in relation to the traits, ideological position, behaviour, experiences, and 
history of the group she/he belongs to. Thus, belonging to a group with a clearly defined identity is 
crucial in developing a clear personal identity, which in turn is important in achieving personal 
psychological well-being (Brannan et al., 2001, p. 17; Brewer, 1991, p. 476; Usborne & Taylor, 
2010, p. 884; TTSRL, 2008b, p. 25).  
Therefore, when an individual is alienated from the main society or even multiple societies 
(i.e. when an individual is unsure of the group she/he belongs to or when the group one identifies 
with rejects one´s membership), the sense of belonging is lost, and with it the personal identity 
clarity. This has been identified as a possible cause for an identity crisis (Korteweg et al., 2010, p. 
30; Choudhury, 2007, p. 4; TTSRL, 2008b, p. 25; King & Taylor, 2011, p. 612; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 
2010, p. 800; Barlett & Miller, 2012, p. 8). And it is this identity crisis that has been pointed out by 
many scholars (Atran, 2008; Barlett & Miller, 2011; Beutel, 2007; Choudhury, 2007; Dalgaard-
Nielsen, 2010; Huband, 2010; Jordán, 2009b; Khosrokhavar, 2005; King & Taylor, 2011; Kirby, 
2007; Korteweg et al., 2010; Ranstorp, 2010:5; Slootman & Tillie, 2006; TTSRL, 2008b; 
Waldmann, Sirseloudi & Malthaner, 2010; Wiktorowicz, 2004) as an explanatory element in the 
radicalisation phenomenon. 
The Radicalisation, Recruitment and the EU Counter-radicalisation Strategy paper, 
presented by the TTSRL (2008b), explains that in some cases second and third generation young 
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European Muslims are westernised enough to not feel part of, or not be accepted in, their parents’ 
community, but at the same time they feel that their country does not recognise them as full 
members, and consequently a double sense of non-belonging can appear, prompting an identity 
crisis (p. 25).  
In consonance with the TTSRL (2008b), some other scholars (Alonso 2010; Barlett & 
Miller, 2012; Bjørgo, 2005; Choudhury, 2007; Clutterbuck, 2010; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; King & 
Taylor, 2011; Kirby, 2007; Korteweg et al., 2010; Ranstorp, 2010; Slootman & Tillie 2006; TTSRL 
2008b; Waldmann et al., 2010,) have also stressed the importance of a sense of belonging or 
alienation in the radicalisation process. 
Regarding the individual’s alienation due to rejection by the group she/he identifies with, 
Tufyal Choudhury (2007) mentions that “experiences of discrimination and racism, a sense of 
blocked social mobility and a lack of confidence in the [...] political system” (p. 4) can intensify the 
disenfranchisement of the individual from society (Choudhury, 2007, p. 4). The radicalising 
qualities of discrimination, blocked social mobility, lack of opportunities and lack of confidence in 
the political system are also mentioned by several other scholars (Moghaddam, 2005; Barlett & 
Miller, 2011; Clutterbuck, 2010; Nesser, 2010; Jordán, 2009b; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Korteweg et 
al., 2010; Ranstorp, 2010; TTSRL 2008b; Kirby, 2007; Wiktorowicz, 2004). Injustices, real or 
perceived, have also been mentioned by many scholars (Jordán 2009b, Kirby 2007, Sageman 2008, 
Bakker 2010, Slootman and Tillie 2006, Moghaddam 2005, Clutterbuck, Dalgaard-Nielsen, 
Korteweg et al. 2010, Ranstorp 2010, Nesser 2010, Atran 2008) as an important instigator of the 
radicalisation process. 
In an attempt to overcome the identity crisis and recover a clearly defined identity, which as 
mentioned before is important for achieving personal psychological well-being, individuals undergo 
a cognitive opening (a state of mind where ideas that the individual would not have considered 
previously begin to have a place in her/his imagination) and begin a search for a new identity and 
group of belonging. (Beutel, 2007, p. 1; Choudhury, 2007, p. 4; Nesser, 2010, p. 91; King & Taylor, 
2011, p. 607; Waldmann et al., 2010, p. 55).  
Olivier Roy (2004) says it is during the cognitive opening that the concept of Ummah, (a de-
territorialised community that defines membership on the basis of Islam and does not discriminate 
by origin, sex, age or race) comes into the picture. The Ummah offers the necessary template for an 
individual to rebuild their sense of self, as well as a clear set of rules that specifies specific 
behaviour and a frame to understand the world (p. 309; Choudhury, 2007, p. 4; King & Taylor, 
2011, p. 612; Kirby, 2007, p. 420; Khosrokhavar, 2005, p. 185; Slootman & Tillie, 2006, p. 54; 
TTSRL, 2008b, p. 25). 
The importance of narrative in the radicalisation phenomenon has been mentioned by a 
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number of authors (Alonso, 2010; Atran, 2008; Barlett & Miller, 2011; Beutel, 2007; Choudhury, 
2007; Clutterbuck, 2010; Huband, 2010; Jordán, 2009b; King & Taylor, 2011; Korteweg et al., 
2010; Moghaddam, 2005; Nesser, 2010; Ranstorp, 2010; TTSRL, 2008b; Sageman, 2008; 
Sedgwick, 2012; Waldmann et al., 2010; Wiktorowicz, 2004).  Narratives should be understood in 
the manner the concept was originally proposed by Erving Goffman in 1974 as an “interpretative 
schemata that simplifies the world out there by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, 
situations, events, experiences and sequences of actions within one´s present or past environment” 
(as cited in Snow, D., Burke Rochford, E., Worden, E., & Benford, R. 1986, p. 464), i.e. the lenses 
through which an individual sees the world.  
All social movements in general have their own frames to understand “the world out there”. 
These collective frames are built in order to justify, legitimise, and inspire the movement and the 
group. When an individual approaches a group, two frames that of the individual and the one held 
by the group begin an interaction and a negotiation of meanings and views. Two outcomes may 
result from this interaction: incompatibility or complementarity of frames. Complementarity of 
frames (frame alignment) occurs when the collective frame resonates with the individual's frame 
and the latter becomes the individual's reference frame. (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614; Dalgaard-
Nielsen, 2010, p. 801-802; Choudhury, 2007, p. 21, 23; Wright, 2009, p. 18; Ranstorp, 2010, p. 4; 
Bjørgo, 2005, p. 4; Sageman, 2008, p. 81-82). 
Sageman (2008) is more specific regarding the exemplification of narrative. As has been 
mentioned before, he refers to the “single narrative”, an ideological construct based on the idea that 
Islam is under attack, as a factor that might push the radicalisation process forward. This narrative 
offers a frame to interpret events in the world. Through this, western foreign policy and 
interventions are connected and understood as an organised campaign to eliminate Islam (p. 81-82; 
Atran, 2008, p. 7; Barlett & Miller, 2011, p. 12; King & Taylor, 2011, p. 608).  
Social networks are emphasised by several authors (Alonso, 2010; Atran, 2008; Beutel, 
2007; Choudhury, 2007; Clutterbuck, 2010; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Huband, 2010; Jordán, 2009b; 
King & Taylor, 2011; Kirby, 2007; Korteweg et al., 2010; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008; 
Moghaddam, 2005; Nesser, 2010; Ranstorp, 2010; Sageman, 2008; Slootman & Tillie, 2006; 
TTSRL, 2008b; Victoroff, 2005; Waldmann et al., 2010; Wiktorowicz, 2005). Sageman (2008), for 
example, points to the fact that “about two thirds of the people in the sample [of his study] were 
friends with other people who joined together or already had some connection to terrorism” (p. 66). 
These findings concur with those of Javier Jordán (2009a); and Donatella della Porta (1988) among 
others (as cited in Victoroff, 2005, p. 13). 
Social networks are tools for integration and social participation, which facilitate contact 
between individuals with similar situational characteristics, interests, or normative, cognitive and 
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affective frames. As mentioned in the TTSRL (2008b) report on Radicalisation, Recruitment and 
the EU Counter-radicalisation Strategy, similarity breeds connection, and individuals tend to look 
for and invest in relationships with like-minded people, which subsequently increases cohesion 
within the group. Later, social norms that regulate members´ behaviour are established. A group 
with these characteristics will have the capacity of changing the perceptions and behaviour of group 
members (p. 26, 27; Jordán, 2009b, p. 209).  
Research has shown that “homegrown” terrorists usually emerge from a group of action-
oriented friends. They live in the same neighbourhood, attend the same school or mosque, or share 
the same hobbies. They do not join these groups because they are radicals but rather they become 
radicals as a result of their membership in the group (Atran, 2008, p. 3; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010, p. 
805; Jordán, 2009b, p. 208, 210-211; King & Taylor, 2011, p. 613; Sageman, 2008, p. 140).  
The linkage between networks, identity and narrative creates a discourse of “us” versus 
“them” that helps create distance between the in-group and the out-group and facilitates carrying 
out violent actions (TTSRL, 2008b, p. 25; Moghaddam, 2005, p. 165; Borum, 2003, p. 8; Slootman 
& Tillie, 2006. P. 4; Grossman, 1995, p. 101, 106; Wright, 2009, p. 19). 
Another frequently appearing factor in the literature regarding radicalisation is deprivation. 
Jitka Malečková (2005) mentions that “Despite much evidence to the contrary in the scholarly 
literature, a common stereotype of terrorist is [...] that of a poor (usually male and often Muslim) 
youth with low education” (p. 33). In a similar fashion, other scholars (TTSRL, 2008b; Sageman, 
2004; Waldmann et al., 2010; Atran, 2008; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; King & Taylor, 2011; Kirby, 
2007; Wiktorowicz, 2004; Moghaddam, 2005) also point out that this stereotype is problematic.  
The oversimplification of the debate on the causes of terrorism has produced substantial 
discussion on the validity of relative deprivation as predictor of radicalisation or terrorism due to 
the failure of separating absolute deprivation and relative deprivation (King & Taylor, 2011, p. 610; 
Kirby, 2007, p. 422; TTSRL, 2008b, p. 20). It has to be noted that relative deprivation refers to the 
discrepancy between what an individual believes that she/he is entitled to obtain and what she/he 
obtains. Perceptions of relative deprivation are built in relation to a relevant other, the individual's 
expectations or previous fulfilments. This means that even if the basic needs of an individual are 
met, a feeling of relative deprivation is still possible (Kawakami and Dion, 1995, p. 553; King & 
Taylor, 2011, p. 609; TTSRL, 2008b, p. 29). 
An illustrative example is given by Michael King and Donald Taylor (2011) that emphasises 
the subjectivity of relative deprivation: during Second World War a survey of US military personnel 
showed higher discontent among the Air Force regarding promotions than within other branches of 
the military, despite the fact that at the time more promotions were being awarded within the Air 
Force as compared to other troops. The researchers argued that the many promotions reminded 
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those who were not promoted about the lack of progress in their own careers, showing that an 
“isomorphic relationship between material conditions and subjective experience” is not always the 
case (p. 609; Moghaddam, 2005, p. 163). 
Through the 1960´s, relative deprivation was applied to a group context and subsequent 
research showed that individuals perceive a higher level of discrimination against the collective 
than against the self. While personal relative deprivation (as experienced by the US Air Force 
members) affects the individual's behaviour, group-based relative deprivation was a better predictor 
of collective mobilisation (Kawakami & Dion, 1995, p. 556; King & Taylor, 2011, p. 610). Not only 
these authors, but some others (Borum, 2003; Bjørgo, 2005; Choudhury, 2007; Sageman, 2004; 
TTSRL, 2008b; Beutel, 2007) have also emphasised the radicalising effects that relative deprivation 
can have. 
In brief, this section has shown that there is wide academic support for the selected 
contributing factors. Thus, identity, lack of opportunities, lack of trust in the political system, 
relative deprivation, narrative, social networks, foreign policy and interventions will be units of 
reference to analyse the effectiveness of counter-radicalisation policies. 
 
2.4 Wrapping up chapter 2 
This chapter has argued that there is a lack of proof to validate the psychopathological theory. In 
addition, it has been mentioned that accepting such a theory could be problematic for the design and 
implementation of appropriate antiterrorism and counter-radicalisation policies. 
The chapter has presented seven models that explain radicalisation as a process. Although 
the process is explained in slightly different ways, they share many of the contributing factors that 
serve to explain the phenomenon. After contrasting these factors with those proposed by other 
scholars and noting the wide acceptance in the related literature, the chapter has selected identity, 
lack of opportunities, lack of trust in the political system, relative deprivation, narrative, social 





In this chapter the reader will find a presentation of the counter-radicalisation policies mentioned in 
section 1.2.1. These policies are divided into three blocks: the first one belonging to the European 
Union, the second to Norway and the third to the Autonomous Region of the Basque Country. 
Chapter 3 is divided into two main sections. The first (section 3.1) presents the historical 
context in which the different policy papers made their appearance. The second part (section 3.2) 
analyses the content. 
 
3.1 Regarding the Context 
The first document, COM 1, was presented in 2005, roughly one month after the July the 7
th
 attacks 
in London that killed 52 people, and builds on the statement made by the European Council on the 
17
th
 of December of 2004
6
 that called for the elaboration of an action plan to tackle radicalisation. 
This mandate came after the fatal incidents in Madrid in March the 11
th
 2004 and in Holland in 
November the 2
nd
 2004, when the Dutch film director Theo van Gogh was assassinated (Jordán, 
2012). 
Likewise, the SCRRT 1 (2005), the EUCTS (2005), the SCRRT 2 (2008) and COM 2 
(2010), were presented in a very similar historical context. From the presentation of COM 1 in 
September 2005 to November 2010 when COM 2 was published, there were no successful terrorist 
attacks in Europe linked to groups with an Islamic background (Jordán, 2012). It is necessary to 
mention, however, that a study made by Javier Jordán (2012), a Spanish expert on Islamic terrorism, 
shows that in the same time period, 30 plots, related to Islamist groups, had been disrupted or had 
failed (p. 400-404). The Glasgow international airport attack, on June the 30
th
 2007 and the 
attempted bombing of the Northwest Airlines flight 253 during the flight from Amsterdam to 
Detroit on December the 25
th
 2009, might be the most known of those plots. 
The RAN (2012) documents were presented relatively soon after the events in Frankfurt 
airport, where two US airmen were killed in a shooting, and in Toulouse and Montauban, where 
three soldiers and four civilians died in three different attacks carried out by the same person.  
Between the publications of RAN in December 2012 and COM 3 in January 2014, a 
successful attack and a failed copycat were carried out. The first attack took place in Woolwich on 
the 22
nd
 of May 2013 when a British Army soldier was attacked and killed by two Muslim converts, 
and the second, three days later in Paris, when a French soldier was stabbed by another Muslim 
convert. 
The first two Norwegian documents, NorCom 1 (2011) and ColSec (2011) are presented in a 
very similar context to that of COM 2 and RAN. It is worth mentioning, however, that these two 
                                                 
6 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/83201.pdf  
26 
 
documents were made public relatively close to the Stockholm suicide attack of 2010, when a man 
detonated two explosive in the city centre, and that it could have influenced their elaboration, due to 
the proximity between the countries. 
The third Norwegian document, NorCOM 2, comes two years after the July 22
nd
 attacks in 
Oslo and Utøya in 2011, where 77 people were killed by right-wing lone wolf Anders Behring 
Breivik. This episode meant the context in which NorCOM 2 was presented was different to the 
previous two Norwegian documents. 
In a similar fashion to NorCOM 2, the Basque PPC is presented in a country specific 
historical context. On October the 20
th
 2011, ETA made public a document announcing the 
definitive cessation of their armed activity
7
. This announcement influenced the creation of the 
General Secretariat for Peace and Coexistence
8
, a political body under the government of the 
Autonomous Region of the Basque Country, that later authored the PPC.  
 
3.2 A Look into the Content 
In order to look at the content, a list of 54 words was created. These words were divided in four 
different categories.  
The first category (section 3.2.1) inquires around the portrayal of the phenomenon of 
radicalisation in the documents through analysing the word selection for its description and the 
word selection for the description of the action taken to confront it. Thus, the following key words 
were selected for the computerised search: radical, radicalism, radicalisation, violent radicalisation 
and violent radical, grouped under radical* for analytical purposes; extremist, extremism, violent 
extremism, grouped under extremist*; terrorist, terrorism, under terrorist*; counter, countering, 
under counter*; prevent, preventing, prevention, also referred as prevent*; address, addressing, as 
address*; combat, combating, as combat*; and, fight and fighting as fight*.  
The second category (section 3.2.2) examines the presence of references to Islam in the 
documents through the words Islam, Islamist, Islamism, grouped under Islam*, and Muslim. 
The third category (section 3.2.3) looks at the presence of causes of radicalisation presented 
in Chapter 2. In order to conduct the count and following the main conclusion of chapter 2, the 
following words were selected: psychopathology, psychopathologies and psychopathological, as 
examples of the conceptualisation of radicalisation as a non-process phenomenon, identity, 
identities and belonging, also shown as identity*; stigmatisation and discrimination, as 
discrimination*; opportunity and opportunities, as opportunities*; trust; relative deprivation; 
narrative and narratives, grouped as narrative*; network and networks, as network*;  foreign 
                                                 
7 http://www.berria.info/dokumentuak/dokumentua849.pdf  
8 http://www.lehendakaritza.ejgv.euskadi.net/r48-subpaz/eu  
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policy; and, intervention and interventions, as intervention*; as markers of radicalisation understood 
as a process.  
Following the TTSRL (2008b, p. 10) classification discrimination*, opportunities and 
narrative* were deemed contributing factors at the individual level, identity*, relative deprivation 
and networks*, as factors at the social level and finally, trust, foreign policy* and intervention*, as 
factors at the external level. 
The fourth category (section 3.2.4) focuses on the concept of western liberal democracy 
used in the documents mentioned in chapter 1 section 1.2.3, as a foundation to conduct the content 
analysis. All six documents were processed through a word-mining software
9
 in search of the most 
used terms. A 100% co-occurrence and a frequency higher than 50 was set as a precondition for 
creating the list presented in Appendix A. Out of the 31 terms that fulfilled the requirement the 10 
most relevant terms were selected. Thus, the list was formed as follows: state, law, public, rights, 
human, protection, freedom, respect, person and nations. 
In order to do the word-count in PPC and NorCOM 2, all the words were translated to the 
closest Spanish and Norwegian equivalent: the list of equivalences is presented in Appendix B. 
The results of conducting the word search through the documents are presented in Appendix 
C. In order to test the validity of the results, the data was re-coded by an assistant with the result of 
3 differences in the coding out of the 540 possibilities. 
 
3.2.1 Portraying the phenomenon of radicalisation. As mentioned in chapter 2, the first 
document on counter-radicalisation presented by a European body, COM 1, defines in the very 
beginning of the document what radicalisation is: “the phenomenon of people embracing opinions, 
views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism” (EC 2005, p. 1) acknowledging that not all 
individuals in contact with radicals end up radicalised and that not all radical groups end up 
committing terrorist acts (EC 2005, p. 4). 
The Norwegian ColSec, the main opus of the Norwegian government regarding counter-
radicalisation, defines radicalisation as “the process whereby a person to an increasing extent 
accepts the use of violence to achieve political goals” (Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police 
[NMJP] 2011, p. 7). The document clarifies that under given circumstances radicalisation could lead 
to extremism i.e. accepting the use of violence to achieve a political goal (NMJP 2011, p. 7). The 
Basque PPC does not present a definition of radicalisation. However, for the purposes of this study 
it will be assumed that it does not differ from those proposed in COM 1 and ColSec. 
Both definitions share certain commonalities such as the understanding of radicalisation as a 
                                                 
9
  Wordstat by Provalis Research 
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process, in line with the conceptualisation presented in Chapter 2, and the defence of the idea that 
radicalisation does not necessarily lead to terrorism (COM 1) or extremism (ColSec). These 
differences in the selection of words to refer to the possible outcome of the radicalisation process, 
however, do matter. As said in Chapter 1, section 1.2.5 language has the power to make meaning of 
things and this, in turn, influences how people think and act towards that specific thing (Mehan, 
1997, p. 250). Correspondingly, using the terms terrorism, extremism and violence will shape the 
perception of radicalisation in a different manner. 
Therefore, it is of notable interest to analyse the terminology used in the aforementioned 
policy papers when referring to the phenomenon of radicalisation and also the word selection made 




When looking at Figure 1, a gradual shift can be observed in the use of words that describe 
the subject towards which these policies are directed. In the European documents, the use of 
terrorist* throughout the first four papers (COM 1, SCRRT 1, EUCTS and SCRRT 2) is noticeably 
higher than that of radical* or extremist*. In these documents terrorist* is used 55.6% of the time 
on average, radical* 36.3% and extremist* an 8.1%.  The shift becomes evident with the RAN 
documents and COM 3, where the softer words radical* and extremist* gain terrain over terrorist*. 
In these last two policy papers terrorist* is used in a 16.7% of the time on average, radical* 51.4% 
and extremis* 31.9%. 
A similar trend can also be appreciated in the Norwegian documents. NorCOM 1 has a clear 
predilection for terrorist* (75%) over radical* (12.5%) and extremist* (12.5%). However, it 
changes with ColSec when these last two terms (radical* 37.0% and extremist* 38.5%) surpass the 
previous (terrorist* 24.4%). In NorCOM 2 the predominance of the term radical* becomes more 
evident at 58%, to the detriment of extremist* (25%) and terrorist* (17%). 
The Basque PPC uses the term terrorist* (32 times through the text) exclusively. The word 
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radical* shows 1 hit, and extremist* is absent from the document. It must be said, however, that 
radical is used as an adjective for distrust: “We come, however, from a time of radical distrust”
10
 
(Secretaría General paz y Convivencia [SGPC], 2013, p. 24). 
Respecting the use of violent radical*, it must be said that according to the data presented in 
Appendix C, it seems to lose its predominance in the European documents after the presentation of 
COM 1.  In this particular paper, out of the 59 hits on the term radical*, in 38 cases violent is used 
as a descriptor of the term radicalisation and radical 64.4%. In contrast COM 3, issued by the same 
European body and of a similar length, shows 70 hits on radical*, but none of them has the 
adjective violent ascribed to it. 
In line with COM 3, the Norwegian papers do not present the connection between the 
concepts of radicalism and violence. Out of the 100 times that radical* is mentioned in ColSec, 
only once does the adjective violent appear next to it and as can be seen, it describes the quality of a 
group not of a radical: “[...] deciding that violent radical groups offer an easy answer to the complex 
challenges they face” (NMJP 2011:10). This document does, however, propose a connection between 
extremism and violence. The fact that out of the 104 times that extremist* appears, 77 times (67.3% of 
the time) it has the adjective violent attached to it. This facilitates the understanding that violence is 
inherent to extremism, a notion first presented in the very definition of extremism adopted in ColSec 
(NMJP 2011:7). 
ColSec is not, however, the first document to make this connection. While the use of violent 
radical* diminished in the European papers after the appearance of COM 1 and violent extremism* was 
absent in COM 1, SCRRT 1, EUCTS and SCRRT 2. The term made its first appearance in COM 2 (1 
hit) and increased to reach 80 hits in RAN and 18 hits in COM 3. 
Figure 2 
 
Regarding the words describing actions taken against radicalism, terrorism and extremism 
                                                 
10
  Own translation. Original in Spanish: “Sin embargo, venimos de un tiempo de desconfianza radical” (PPC 2013:24). 
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Figure 2 shows a similar trend to Figure 1. On the side of the soft words, both counter and prevent* 
gain prominence through the documents, nonetheless, at the same time address* is gradually 
reduced. In respect of the hard words it must be said that through the first four European 
documents, (COM 1, SCRRT 1, EUCTS and SCRRT 2) combat* can be counted in a similar 
percentage, (15%, 23.5%, 20% and 30% respectively) while fight* is absent after COM 1 (27.5%). 
In the RAN papers and COM 3, however, fight* makes its way back into the documents (4.1% and 
3.6% respectively) in exchange of combat* that nearly disappears by being mentioned three and 
five times respectively (1.5% and 6.0%). The predominant use of soft words throughout the texts is 
also present in the Norwegian policy papers where there is a remarkable preponderance of prevent*, 
which starts with 43.8% in NorCOM 1 and reaches its peak in ColSec with 83.4% and 70% in 
NorCOM 2. In a similar fashion, the PPC mostly utilises prevent*. While prevent* is used 56.5% of 
the time in this document, address* is used 29.62% of the time and combat* and fight* each appear 
4.3% of the time. 
The analysis shows that COM 1, SCRRT 1, EUCTS, and SCRRT 2 use a lexicon that 
facilitates the unconscious linkage between the concept of radicalisation, extremism and terrorism, 
and radicalisation and violence. The results for COM 2, RAN and COM 3, however, show a 
tendency towards softer wording. The term radical* becomes predominant, which helps in 
understanding that radicalisation is the focus of the documents. The linkage between radicalisation 
and violence is broken through the texts, although it is extremist* that becomes easily linked to 
violence. These last three documents also use less aggressive jargon to refer to the action taken to 
confront the phenomenon of radicalisation. 
The Norwegian documents, especially its main paper ColSec, also show a big predilection 
for the less emotionally charged words such as prevent* and radical*. The Basque PPC in turn uses 
terrorist* exclusively, but then uses the word prevent* to refer to the actions to be taken. 
This section has argued that soft descriptors become more utilised through the documents 
while hard descriptors diminish. This could generate the idea that a negative relationship between 
the two types of descriptors exists, i.e. the increase in soft terms is related to the decrease of the 
hard ones and vice versa. When looking at the correlation between the use of these words, however, 
Pearson´s r does not show any relation between radical* and terrorist*, r(11) = .53, p > .09; and, 
extremist* and terrorist*, r(11) = .46, p > .15.  Therefore, it could be argued that the trend itself 
does not respond to linguistic reasons, but to some external factors such as the historical context. 
In a similar way, the relation between soft action descriptors and hard action descriptors is 
virtually non-existent. Pearson´s r, once again, shows no relationship between counter* and 
combat*, r(11) = .13, p > .69; counter* and fight*, r(11) = .40, p > .22; prevent* and combat*, r(11) 
= .48, p > .13; prevent* and fight*, r(11) = .21, p > .53; and address* and combat*, r(11) = .29, p > 
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.39. There is, however, a mild relationship between address* and fight*, r(11) = .66, p > .03. It 
could be argued that the lack of correlation, as mentioned before, is not related to linguistic reasons, 
but points towards external factors to explain the trend shown in Figure 2. 
When looking at the correlations between the use of the terms describing individuals and 
actions, the following can be seen: there is a strong relationship between the use of hard descriptors 
of individuals, terrorist* in this case, and the hard action descriptors, combat* and fight*. Person´s r 
analysis shows that r(11) = .78, p > .004; in a similar way it can be said that the soft descriptors, 
radical* and extremist*,  and soft action descriptive terms, counter*, prevent* and address* are 
strongly correlated: r(11) = .98, p > .000.  
From these results, it could be interpreted that radical*, extremist*, counter*, prevent* and 
address* are part of a narrative, and terrorist*, combat* and fight* of another. Terrorism is 
combated and fought, however, radicalism is countered, prevented and addressed, and since this last 
notion is the one gaining weight through the documents it could be argued that counter-
radicalisation has started to become different from counter-terrorism. 
 
3.2.2 Pointing towards Islam. Another interesting point regarding the selection of words in 
the documents refers to the use of Islam* and Muslim. Four European documents (SCRRT 1, 
EUCTS, SCRRT 2 and COM 2) issue the recommendation of developing a non-emotive lexicon to 
avoid the stigmatisation of specific communities. In the same line, it is stated in COM 1 that “there 
is no such thing as Islamic terrorism, nor catholic terrorism, nor red terrorism” (EC 2005:4). 
Similarly, ColSec mentions that radicalisation has been proved not to be intrinsic to any specific 
group, ideology or political orientation (NMJP 2011:9). These same texts, however, claim that 





By looking at the results of the word count in figure 3 it can be seen that the European 
documents seem to follow the proposed recommendation and progressively diminish the use of 
Islam* and Muslim*. The increase in the presence of the selected terms in the RAN documents does 
not necessarily imply that the document has re-started the focus on Islam. First, because in the 
documents Islam and Muslims are still the focus even though they are not mentioned specifically, as 
can be seen in COM 2, “Terrorist organisations adapt and innovate, as demonstrated by the 2008 
Mumbai attacks, the attempted attack on a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day 
2009 and plots uncovered recently affecting several Member States” (EC 2010:7) and COM 3 
Armed with newly acquired combat skills, many of these foreign fighters could pose a threat to our security on 
their return from conflict zone. In the longer term they could act as catalysts for terrorism. The phenomenon of 
foreign fighters is not a new one, but as fighting in Syria continues, the number of extremists travelling to take 
part in the conflict is rising. And as the number of Europeans rises, so does the threat to our security (EC 
2014:2).  
And second because in relative terms and due to the length of the document (20,174 words) 
the presence of Islam* is lower than in COM 1, SCRRT 1, EUCTS and SCRRT 2 and Muslim* is 
lower than in COM 1 and SCRRT 1. 
The trend present in the European documents, however, is not completely clear in the 
Norwegian papers since Islam* and Muslim show a high number of hits in ColSec, however, 
NorCOM 2 does not show any of these terms. It is worth stressing that the speaker avoids referring 
to Islam and Muslims even when directly asked about them. The Basque PPC does not show any 
hits in either of the selected terms, this is due to the fact that its sole focus is clearly ETA (a word 
count on ETA will show a total amount of 121 hits. 
 
3.2.3 On the causes of radicalisation. Although the papers being analysed do not 
necessarily deal with the contributing causes of the radicalisation process, the fact that they all 
present measures to address this phenomenon opens the possibility for their mention. Therefore, this 





Figure 4 shows the use of radicalisation factors through the documents. The first interesting 
point to mention is that following the trend in research done around radicalisation, references to the 
psychopathological theory are absent from all the documents. The term relative deprivation, 
however, is also missing in all documents. In addition the term narrative* is also absent from the 
Norwegian documents and discrimination* and foreign policy* from the PPC. 
Among the terms that at least show one hit in any of the documents foreign policy* would 
be the most scarcely represented. The term has been used 19 times throughout the documents and 
shows the smallest co-occurrence (RAN, NorCOM 1 and ColSec).   
Looking at the general picture presented in Figure 4, narrative* is the number one repeated 
contributing factor through the documents due to the high amount of hits that the terms shows in the 
RAN documents (103). Opportunities* is, however, the factor of radicalisation that co-occurs more 
frequently (nine documents), being present in COM 1 (2 times), SCRRT 1 (3 time), EUCTS (1 
time), SCRRT 2 (3 times), COM 2 (1 time), RAN (12 time), COM 3 (3 times), ColSec (13 times) 
and PPC (6 times). 
RAN is the document mentioning the highest amount of the contributing factors, namely 
identity* (7 times), discrimination (4 times), opportunities* (12 times), trust (10 times), narrative* 
(103 times) networks* (24 times), foreign policy* (7 times) and intervention* (33 times). On the 
contrary, EUCTS and NorCOM 1, are the documents showing the fewest amount of hits in the 
selected words (1 hit on discrimination and 1 on opportunities* in the first, and 1 hit on trust and 1 
hit on foreign policy* in the second). In a similar manner COM 2, with 1 hit on opportunities*, 2 on 
narrative* and 3 on networks*, also shows a low amount of hits in the proposed terms.  
When looking at the radicalisation factors by blocks (individual, social and external) some 
other interesting inferences can be made. Regarding the European policy papers, COM 1 appears to 
focus on the social level showing 77.4% of the hits at this level. The SCRRT 1, SCRRT 2 and COM 
2 share a focus on the social and the individual level.  The first and third documents show 50% of 
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the hits at each of the two levels while the SCRRT 2 shows a 44.4% at the individual and 55.6 at the 
social. 
 In a different way, the EUCTS, the RAN documents and COM 3 reveals a predilection for 
contributing factors on the individual level. In this manner all the first document's hits belong to this 
level as well as 59.9% of the hits on the second document and 52.9% on the third. It is in the RAN 
documents and the COM 3 that the first mentions of contributing factors at the external level are 
made, with 25% and 11.8% of the hits respectively. 
 Regarding the Norwegian policy papers it could be said that NorCOM 1 shows an exclusive 
focus on the external level while ColSec appears more diversified by showing 39.4% of the hits at 
the individual level, 31% at the social level and 29% on the external level. NorCOM 2 in turn shows 
60 % hits on the social level and 40% on the individual. 
 Finally, the Basque PPC has a diversified focus showing a high percentage of hits in all three 
levels. However, it could be pointed out that this document seems to stress the social and external 
level by showing 40.4% of the hits on the first and 38.3% on the second. 
 
 3.2.4 Counter-radicalisation policies and the notion of western liberal democracy. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, section 1.2.3, the Norwegian constitution, the Spanish constitution, the 
Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the EU, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights will 
be used in Chapter 4 in order to see if the recommendations proposed by the selected policy 
documents to address radicalisation, guarantee the liberties surmised in a western liberal democracy. 
 This section, however, seeks to explore if the selected policies are embedded in the western 




Figure 5 shows that human and rights are the terms that co-occur the most, appearing in nine 
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out of the 11 documents. In addition these are also the terms repeated more times (156 and 169 
times respectively). The high number of right* and human, however, is due to the fact that they 
appear 140 times (right*) and 127 times (human) in the PPC. On the contrary, nations is the term 
co-occurring the least (3 documents) as well as showing the fewest amount of hits (8). 
ColSec and PPC are the documents that show the highest amount of selected words, 10 out 
of 10, and the highest amount of total hits (108 the former and 314 the latter).  The RAN documents 
also show a high presence of terms (nine out of 10) and an overall hit number of 90. In contrast, 
NorCOM 2 and COM 2 show no hits on a single term in the first, and one hit in the second (in law). 
The wide use of the selected terms, disregarding the two aforementioned papers, especially 
in the longest documents, shows that the policy papers are well embedded in the western liberal 
democratic tradition. This serves to put in context the comments about countering radicalisation 
through “transparent, democratic and generally accepted methods” (NMJP 2011:8) used in some 
documents, and validates the analysis on the extent to which the measures proposed in the selected 
counter-radicalisation policies are compatible with the liberties surmised in a western liberal 
democracy.  
 
3.3 Wrapping up Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 has presented the historical context in which all the documents were published, following 
the idea that policy papers have to be understood in relation to the events occurring close to their 
publication time. 
This chapter has also looked into the content of the documents by analysing the words used 
to describe the individuals undergoing the radicalisation process, the words used for describing the 
actions taken to counter the radicalisation phenomenon, the terms identifying the specific group of 
interest of this study,. As well as the presence of direct mentions to the contributing factors of 
radicalisation presented in Chapter 2, and the embedding of the policy papers within the western 
liberal democratic discourse through a list of widely used terms in the UDHR, ICCPR, ECHR, 
CFREU and the Norwegian and Spanish constitutions. 
The word analysis points towards the existence of trends that show a reduction in the use of 
hard terms such as terrorist*, combat* and fight* and an increase in the softer descriptors radical*, 
extremist*, prevent*, counter* and address*. It has been argued that such a change could be related 
to the historical context and the establishment of counter-radicalisation as a concept that is linked 
to, but different from counter-terrorism. In addition, the content analysis has shown that a positive 
relationship exists between the use of hard descriptors for individuals and hard descriptors for the 
actions taken, as well as between their soft counterparts. In a similar way, Chapter 3 has drawn 
attention on the downward tendency in the use of words that identify Muslims as the receiving 
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group of these policies, and has argued that it might respond to the attempt of avoiding the 
stigmatisation of the group, and with it the contributing factor of discrimination. It must be said, 
however, that a careful reading of the documents is enough to understand Muslims are still the main 
focus of the policies. 
This chapter has also shown that term-wise the COM 1 appears to be more focused on the 
contributing factors at the social level, the SCRRT 1, SCRRT 2 and COM 2 seem to focus on a 
combination of social and individual contributing factors and the EUCTS, RAN and COM 3 focus 
mainly on the individual level. In turn, while NorCOM 1 focuses on the external level contributing 
factors NorCOM 2 focuses on the social, and ColSec appears more diversified, setting a similar 
focus on all three levels. Regarding the PPC, Chapter 3 has shown that it stresses the social and the 
external levels. 
Finally, the content analysis has shown that at the very least, the three longest documents, 





Following the contextualisation and content analysis of the selected policy papers made 
in chapter 3, the reader will find the analysis of the overlapping of the counter-
radicalisation measures and the contributing factors of radicalisation presented in 
Chapter 2. 
The majority of the documents do not present the reader with a set list of 
measures. It is, however, possible to conduct a manual identification and compilation of 
the proposed measures. A full list of these policy recommendations is presented in 
Appendix D. 
 
4.1 Policy Recommendations 
4.1.1 Policy recommendations in COM 1. A total number of 11 
recommendations that address, in a direct way, the radicalisation phenomenon have 
been identified in the document. 
Two of the 11 proposals (number 1 and 2) could be classified as hard measures; 
both addressing the narrative factor. In addition to this contributing factor, measure 
number 2 could also be considered as addressing the social network factors when 
referring to the prohibition of internet services provided illegally (EC, 2005, p. 4), if the 
possibility of prohibiting virtual meeting points such as chat rooms and forums is 
considered. 
Measures 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8, address identity related issues. While number 3 
stresses the importance of promoting cultural diversity, intercultural dialogue and 
putting emphasis on the European common values (EC, 2005, p. 5). Measure number 4, 
calls for the development of the concept of European citizenship and intercultural 
understanding (EC, 2005, p. 5-6) and in a very similar way measure number 8 makes 
the case for promoting inter-faith dialogue (EC, 2005, p. 7). Measure number 5 calls for 
the promotion of integration and the prevention of a double sense of non-belonging and 
stresses that a “holistic approach to integration is necessary that includes not only access 
to the labour market for all groups but also measures which deal with social, cultural, 
religious, linguistic and national differences” (EC, 2005, p. 6). The possibility of 
integrating without having to renounce to one´s own identity could be considered not 
only as a measure preventing possible inter-group tensions, but also as a possible 
reducing measure of the group relative deprivation factor. To this measure number 6 
adds that discrimination has to be taken as a key element to integration (EC, 2005, p. 6). 
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Measure 3 also focuses on discrimination by stressing the importance of tackling 
racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia (EC, 2005, p. 5).  
Measure number 7 responds to the factor of opportunities. It calls for the 
promotion of equal opportunities for the disadvantaged groups and encourages 
“increased regeneration of, and accessibility to, deprived areas and neighbourhoods, 
improved housing conditions, encouraged access to education and protection from 
social exclusion […] fulfilling quality of life and ensuring individuals are engaged with 
society, on a personal level” (EC, 2005, p. 6-7). This measure could also potentially 
serve to deal with feelings of discrimination and relative deprivation. 
Measure 9 proposes increasing the engagement of the police and other security 
forces with civil society, and especially with the youth (EC, 2005, p. 7). This could 
potentially enhance the credibility of the political system among civil society by 
showing that the role of the police is not that of repression. In a similar way and most 
likely with a similar effect, the aforementioned measure number 8 proposes promoting 
dialogue between the state and religion (EC, 2005, p. 7), opening the political arena for 
those who had not a strong voice previously. 
Finally, measures number 10 and 11 set their focus on the western foreign policy 
perception factor. They propose firstly to offer assistance to third countries in order to 
reduce inequalities, support democratisation and promote human rights. And secondly 
cultural and inter-religious understanding between Europe and third countries is 
proposed (EC, 2005, p. 9). 
 
4.1.2 Policy recommendations in SCRRT 1, EUCTS and SCRRT 2. The 
SCRRT 1, EUCTS and SCRRT 2 concur on most of the proposed measures to tackle the 
phenomenon of radicalisation as can be seen in Table 1. The * represent a minor 
wording modification and the x represent the absence of a similar measure. 
Table 1 
  SCRRT 1 EUCTS SCRRT 2 
measure # 1 1 1 
measure # 2 2 2 
measure # 3 3 3 
measure # 4 4 4 
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measure # 5 5 5 
measure # 6 6 6 
measure # 7 x 7 
measure # 8 x 8* 
measure # 11 x 9* 
measure # 13 7* 10* 
measure # 14 8* 11 
measure # 15 10 12 
measure # 16 11 13 
measure # 17 12 14 
measure # 18 9 15 
 
A quick look at Table 1 and a read through the documents shows that the text of 
SCRRT 1 was transferred only with minor changes to the EUCTS and its 2008 revision 
the SCRRT 2. In this manner, the SCRRT 1 proposes only three measures (number 9, 10 
and 12) out of 18 that are not mentioned in the other two documents. The EUCTS and 
the SCRRT 2 propose one each (measures 13 and 15), one measure out of 13 in the 
EUCTS and one out of 16 in the SCRRT 2.  
Regarding these measures, it must be said that measures number 9 and 10 of the 
SCRRT 1 address the factor of narrative by encouraging the availability of mainstream 
literature (about Islam) and the emergence of European Imams (CEU, 2005a, p. 4). 
Measure number 12 of the same document: “correct unfair and inaccurate perceptions of 
Islam and Muslims” (CEU, 2005a, p. 4) would respond to the discrimination factor. 
Regarding the stand-alone measure proposed by the EUCTS it could be signalled as 
dealing with narrative and social networks as it proposes dealing with both incitement 
and recruitment in specific key environments (CEU, 2005b, p. 9). The SCRRT 2´s 
measure number 15 of developing “external economic policies” (SCRRT 2 2008:5) in 
turn could be said to set its focus on influencing the factor of foreign policy. 
Measures number 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the three papers, as well as the 
aforementioned measure number 13 of the EUCTS, could be considered as coercive. 
Measures number 2 “monitor internet and travel to conflict zones” (CEU, 2005a, p. 3; 
CEU, 2005b, p. 8, 9; CEU 2008, p. 4) addresses the factors of narrative and social 
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networks. This double focus would lie primarily on the monitoring of the internet where 
both propaganda and specific virtual meeting points could be controlled. In a similar 
way measure number 3 calling to limit those individuals playing a role in radicalisation 
could be said to be addressing also the narrative and social network factors. Measures 
number 4 and 6 of the three documents set their focus on social networks, supposing 
that contacts are the primordial requirement to access terrorist training. Measure number 
5 calls for setting a “legal framework to prevent individuals from inciting and 
legitimising violence” (CEU, 2005a, p. 3; CEU, 2005b, p. 8; CEU, 2008:4), which could 
be classified as addressing the narrative factor. 
Measure number 1 of the SCRRT 1, EUCTS and SCRRT 2, calling to build 
community policing (CEU, 2005a, p. 3; CEU, 2005b, p. 8; CEU, 2008, p. 4) and measure 
number 7 of the SCRRT 1 and SCRRT 2, encouraging political dialogue (CEU, 2005a, p. 
3; CEU, 2008, p. 4) could be said to be addressing the lack of confidence in the political 
system factor, first by showing that the police is part of the community and second by 
reducing the divide between political institutions and society. 
The SCRRT 1 and SCRRT 2 call in their measure number 8 for empowering 
mainstream voices (CEU, 2005a, p. 4; CEU 2008, p. 5) in an attempt to counter the 
narratives used by extremists, and therefore these measures could be classified as 
answering the narrative factor. 
The three documents (with measure number 18 in SCRRT 1, 9 in EUCTS and 16 
in SCRRT 2) propose promoting “good governance, human rights, democracy, as well as 
education and economic prosperity” in third countries (CEU, 2005a, p. 5; CEU, 2005b, 
p. 9; CEU, 2008, p. 5). Both SCRRT documents (measure 11 in SCRRT 1 and 9 in 
SCRRT 2) also call for actively changing the perceptions of European and western 
policies, SCRRT 1 specifies by adding “particularly among Muslim communities” 
(CEU, 2005a, p. 4; CEU, 2008, p. 5). It could be said that the focus of these measures is 
addressing the radicalising power of foreign policy.  
Developing a non-emotive lexicon to avoid linking terrorism and Islam (CEU, 
2005a, p. 4; CEU, 2005b, p. 8; CEU, 2008, p. 5) is mentioned in the three documents, in 
order to avoid exacerbating divisions in society and stigmatising a specific group. Thus, 
it could be said that measure 13 of the SCRRT 1, 7 of the EUCTS and 10 of the SCRRT 
2 address the radicalising factors caused by identity and discrimination. 
Measure number 14 in SCRRT 1, 8 in EUCTS and 11 in SCRRT 2 call for 
eliminating the structural factors that prompt radicalisation, such as the lack of political 
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and economic prospects, unresolved international and domestic strife, inadequate and 
inappropriate education, cultural opportunities for young people or identity issues (CEU, 
2005a, p. 4; CEU, 2005b, p. 9; CEU, 2008, p. 5). The wide array of factors mentioned 
could not only be said to address the lack of opportunities, identity and the foreign policy 
factor, but also that of relative deprivation. In a similar way measure number 15 of the 
SCRRT 1, 10 of the EUCTS and 12 of the SCRRT 2 call for “targeting inequality and 
discrimination” (CEU, 2005a, p. 5; CEU, 2005b, p. 9; CEU, 2008, p. 5), which also sets 
the focus on the opportunities and discrimination factors. 
Finally, measures number 16 and 17 of the SCRRT 1, 11 and 12 of the EUCTS 
and 13 and 14 of the SCRRT 2, through the promotion of inter-cultural dialogue and the 
promotion of long term integration (CEU, 2005a, p. 5; CEU, 2005b, p. 9; CEU, 2008, p. 
5), could be said to be focusing on identity issues. It should be noted that the EUCTS 
adds the necessity of extending inter-cultural dialogue to the international sphere (CEU, 
2005b, p. 9), and thus it could be considered an attempt to influence the foreign policy 
factor. 
 
4.1.3 Policy recommendations in COM 2. The document offers a total number 
of four measures addressing radicalisation in a direct manner. All four measures could 
be classified as soft measures due to their proactive nature. 
Measures number 1 of promoting close cooperation between local authorities 
and civil society and number 3 of developing local community-based approaches and 
prevention policies (EC, 2010, p. 3) could address the radicalising factor of lack of trust 
in the political system. 
Measure number 2: “empowering key groups in vulnerable communities” (EC, 
2010, p. 7) could be understood as providing them with opportunities to achieve a 
meaningful life which would not only offer an answer to the lack of opportunities 
factors, but could also be qualified as addressing relative deprivation. 
Finally, measure number 4 focuses on the narrative factor by calling for the 
support of civil society organisations in countering extremist narratives by exposing, 
translating and challenging them (EC, 2010, p. 7).  
 
4.1.4 Policy recommendations in RAN. The RAN documents present the 
reader with a total amount of 48 measures. The documents are divided into eight 
different sections, namely RAN-POL (proposing 3 measures), VVT (4 measures), RAN 
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@ (2 measures), PREVENT (9 measures), P&P (4 measures), HEALTH (2 measures), 
INT/EXT (16 measures) and HLCP (8 measures). 
Out of the 48 measures, two (measures number 1 and 22) could be considered 
coercive. Measure number 1 does not only call for the removal of illegal extremist 
material from the internet, but it also presents the collaboration between internet service 
providers and security agencies as positive in the countering of radicalisation and, as 
has been pointed out previously (see measures 1 of the SCRRT 1, EUCTS and SCRRT 
2), this could be said to be answering the narrative and the social network factors. 
Measure number 22, which calls for the supervision of communications in prisons 
(Radicalisation Awareness Network [RAN], 2012e, p. 4), addresses the factor of 
narrative as well.  
Among the soft measures identified through the documents, numbers 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 18, 21, 26, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 45, 46 and 47 address the 
radicalising influence of the narrative factor in different ways. Measures number 14, 40 
and 45 for example call for the involvement of “formers” in order to counter extremist 
narratives (RAN, 2012d, p. 5; RAN, 2012g, p. 7; RAN, 2013, p. 3). In a different 
fashion, measures number 4, 5, 6 and 7, all part of the VVT section, call for the 
participation of victims in constructing narratives to challenge extremist propaganda 
(RAN, 2012b, p. 3-4). In addition, measures 3, 18 and 46 make their case for the idea of 
promoting critical thinking and enhanced digital literacy among the youth to build 
resilience against extremist narratives (RAN, 2012a, p. 3; RAN, 2012d, p. 9; RAN, 
2013:3). 
Measure 29 also promotes tackling the narrative factor, however, due to its 
mention of promoting student exchanges it could be defined as also dealing with 
identity issues (RAN, 2012g, p. 4). Around these identity issues revolve measures 31 
and 32. The first one calls for the enhancement of the parenting and communication 
skills of diaspora communities (RAN, 2012g, p. 5), and although enhancing parenting 
skills could be perceived as a negative stereotype, the enhancement of communication 
skills is aimed at dealing with identity issues such as the double sense of non-belonging. 
Measure number 32 proposes exchanges (RAN, 2012g, p. 5) in a similar way to the 
aforementioned measure 29.  
In addition, measure 32 also proposes fostering youth entrepreneurship (RAN, 
2012g, p. 5), which could be said to deal with the lack of opportunities factor. Measures 
number 20 and 24 could be said to be dealing with this same factor as well. The former 
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proposes lowering the number of factors that could lead to grievances inside prisons 
(RAN, 2012e, p. 3) and the latter calls for the empowerment of migrants, minorities and 
individuals in vulnerable situations (RAN, 2012f, p. 4). Furthermore, measure 24 
mentions the importance of making individuals and groups in danger of social exclusion 
feel included rather than excluded from public services (RAN, 2012f, p. 4) which could 
in turn, be classified as tackling the factor of discrimination. The combination of 
addressing the lack of opportunities factor and the discrimination factor could make 
measure 24 also a positive influence regarding relative deprivation. Measures tackling 
feelings of discrimination are also number 10, 16, 26, 34 and 48. Challenging racism, 
intolerance, institutional prejudice, avoiding collectively labelling communities and 
preparing de-stigmatising campaigns are the proposed actions in these measures (RAN, 
2012d, p. 2, 7; RAN, 2012g, p. 3, 5; RAN, 2013, p. 3). This last measure could also be 
classified as tackling identity issues that could appear in case of direct stigmatisation of 
a community by the government. 
Many of the measures in the RAN documents seem to have their focus on 
targeting the lack of trust in the political system factor. In this manner measures number 
11, 12, 15, 17, 19, 23, 28, 30, 33, 38, 42, 43 and 44 call, among other things, for 
empowering local actors to collaborate in counter-radicalisation initiatives (RAN, 
2012c, p. 3), opening forums to discuss domestic and foreign policy (RAN, 2012d:6), 
encouraging community policing (RAN, 2012f, p. 2), providing psychological 
counselling to traumatised families and youth (RAN, 2012g, p. 4) and increasing 
dialogue with and support for diaspora communities (RAN, 2013, p. 2). 
In addition, the aforementioned measures 19 and 28, 44 could be said to also 
focus on the social networks factor. The availability of “safe” social networks could 
prevent individuals in difficult situations from joining “non-safe” support networks. 
 
4.1.5 Policy recommendations in COM 3. A total of 12 measures have been 
identified in COM 3. Out of these 12, two could be categorised as coercive measures 
(number 3 and 4). Their focus on preventing extremist propaganda and removing illegal 
content from the internet (EC, 2014, p. 8) could be said to address, as mentioned in the 
measures in previous documents, not only the narrative factor, but also social networks 
if one understands certain virtual meeting points as illegal. 
Among the measures classified as soft, the first two call for an enhanced 
collaboration between front line workers, security services and civil society, and 
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emphasises trust building (EC, 2014, p. 4), and could be defined as measures addressing 
the radicalising factor of a lack of confidence in the political system. 
Measures 5, 6, 8, 9, 10 and 11 set their focus on challenging the extremist 
narratives through the spreading of a positive and carefully focused message, 
encouraging critical thinking and empowering victims and funding projects that enable 
them to tell their stories (EC, 2014, p. 8, 9). 
In contrast to the general line of focus in COM 3, measure number 7 proposes 
encouraging intercultural dialogue and youth exchanges and even building resilience 
against extremist propaganda (EC, 2014, p. 9). This would be classified as addressing 
the narrative factor, dialogue and exchange, and as has been signalled in previous policy 
papers, it would also serve to influence identity related issues. 
Finally, measure number 12 could be said to address the foreign policy factor 
since it states that the external dimensions of counter-radicalisation should be in 
consonance with the internal dimensions (EC, 2014, p. 11). 
 
4.1.6 Policy recommendations in NorCOM 1. NorCOM 1 presents the reader 
with five measures to counter the radicalisation phenomenon. All five measures could 
be said to be addressing the lack of trust in the political system factor. Measure number 
1, which calls for tolerance of views and opinions and to fight them with democratic 
methods and intellectual weapons when necessary (Thorshaug, 2011), would be a clear 
example while measure number 4 would go further and address the discrimination 
factor as well (Thorshaug, 2011). 
 
4.1.7 Policy recommendations in ColSec. The document presents the reader 
with a set list of 30 measures of which 13 address the radicalisation phenomenon in a 
direct form. Measure number 1, “better information about regulations relating to people 
who may pose a security risk” (NMJP 2011:28) addresses in a similar way to measure 
number 3 of the SCRRT 1, EUCTS and SCRRT 2, the factor of social networks, and 
therefore should be considered as a coercive measure. 
Measures number 2 and 3 that call for revising the government´s and the 
Ministry of Justice and the police's crisis communication strategy (NMJP 2011:29, 31) 
could be said to address the radicalising factor of discrimination and identity, as the 
stigmatising of a specific group would enhance the breach between social groups. In 
turn, measure number 4, 8 and 9 that propose the promotion and facilitation of 
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collaboration between civil society, the police and other authorities (NMJP 2011:31, 32, 
33) could positively influence the lack of trust in the political system factor. 
Measures number 5 and 6, setting “courses in Norwegian social conditions for 
religious leaders with immigrant backgrounds” (NMJP 2011:31) and setting a course for 
newly arrived immigrants in “Norwegian social studies and understanding democracy” 
(NMJP 2011:32) could be said to be influencing the narrative factor as well as being 
part of a broader integration policy and therefore be classified as also dealing with 
identity related factors. In this category of addressing the narrative factor measure 
number 13, that calls for strengthening religion and faith group programmes for 
prisoners, could also be placed (NMJP 2011:34). 
Measure number 7 of pushing international dialogue and working to deliver 
appropriate foreign policies addresses the foreign policy factor. Finally, policy numbers 
10, 11 and 12, which propose working towards strengthening the Norwegian National 
Housing Bank, getting more people to complete secondary school and delivering 
initiatives directed to unemployed youth (NMJP 2011:33, 34), address the lack of 
opportunities factor but also when taken altogether they influence positively relative 
deprivation. 
 
4.1.8 Policy recommendations in NorCOM 2. A total number of six measures 
have been identified in this document. Measure number 2, which calls for considering 
placing international travel restrictions upon those at risk of radicalisation, could be 
classified as a hard measure. 
Regarding the other five it can be pointed out that in a similar fashion to 
NorCOM 1, this paper stresses the measures that address the lack of trust factor. In this 
manner measures number 4, which proposes strengthening cooperation with minority 
communities and municipalities (Amundsen, 2013), number 5, calling for the 
development of a strategy that is publicly open and built from the bottom up to counter 
the radicalisation phenomenon (Amundsen, 2013), and number 6, mentioning that 
mechanisms to offer an alternative to informing the police about radicalisation, should 
be established (Amundsen, 2013), could be identified as such. 
Measure number 1 calls for action to stop the internet becoming a venue for 
recruitment and radicalisation. In a similar fashion to previously mentioned measures, 
this should be considered on the one side to address the narrative factor and on the other 
the social networks factor, especially since a direct mention of virtual social networks is 
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made in the document.  Finally, measure number three would answer the identity factor 
for its plea to work for creating a sense of belonging, putting special attention on the 
youth (Amundsen, 2013). 
 
4.1.9 Policy recommendations in PPC. A total amount of 18 counter-
radicalisation compatible measures have been identified in the document. A quick look 
through the document shows that the main focus of the PPC is to establish a feeling of 
peaceful coexistence within civil society and increasing trust in the political system. 
In this manner, it could be said that eight of the measures (number 2, 3, 5, 6, 14, 
16 and 18) focus on the narrative factor. Measure number 3 for example calls for the 
creation of new narratives through public debate (SGPC, 2013, p. 38), measure number 
14 proposes to use victim testimonies to create awareness in schools (SGPC, 2013, p. 
70) and measures that focus on the promotion of peace, coexistence and 
multiculturalism among the youth (SGPC, 2013, p. 72). Measure number 3 could also 
be classified as targeting identity issues as the appearance of new narratives created 
within society might bring the redefinition of social identity, groups and categories 
existing to the moment. 
With the goal of increasing trust the PPC presents measures 8, 10, 11, 12 and 15. 
In this way enhancing communication channels between civil society and the 
government mentioned in measure 8 (SGPC, 2013, p. 50), encouraging individuals to 
contribute with suggestions, criticisms and opinions regarding the programme of 
measure number 12 (SGPC, 2013, p. 66) or listening to the experiences of the youth 
regarding peace and coexistence mentioned in measure 15 (SGPC, 2013, p. 72) are 
initiatives that could potentially serve to influence positively the lack of trust in the 
political system factor, by changing the perception of detachment between society and 
political institutions. 
Measures number 1 and 7 could be said to be answering the radicalising factor 
of discrimination. Measure 1 calls for the promotion of an educational system based on 
the notions of human rights and opposed to sexism, xenophobia, racism and violence 
(SGPC, 2013, p. 30). Measure 7 proposes to recognise and empower the victims of 
illicit counter-terrorism operations by putting a special emphasis on victims of torture 
(SGPC, 2013, p. 44, 46) who were not previously recognised as victims by public 
institutions. This last measure could also serve to positively influence the sense of 
relative deprivation felt by parts of society. 
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Finally, measures number 4, 9 and 17 could be classified as targeting the lack of 
opportunities factor. Although measure number 9, which calls for the promotion of 
inmate reintegration initiatives (SGPC, 2013, p. 52), could be equated to the measures 
focusing on creating more opportunities mentioned in previous documents, measure 
number 4 and 17 have been included in this category due to the particular context where 
the enhancement in political participation could be understood as the enhancement of 
opportunities. Therefore, creating a public space for social debate mentioned in measure 
4 (SGPC, 2013, p. 30) and promoting creativity entrepreneurship and social innovation 
among the youth in order to develop projects regarding peace and coexistence proposed 
in measure 17 (SGPC, 2013, p. 72), should be understood as tackling the lack of 
opportunities factor. Measure number 4 could also be said to positively influence the 
identity issues due to the possibilities that have been opened up for the society to 
negotiate and redefine social identities and boundaries.  
 
4.1.10 A quick overview. The findings of this chapter can be schematically 




















COM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
SCRRT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
EUCTS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
SCRRT 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
COM 2 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
RAN 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
COM 3 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 
NorCOM 
1 
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
ColSec 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
NorCOM 
2 
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 
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PPC 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
 
As can be seen in Table 2, none of the documents present measures to counter 
the foreign policy factor. In contrast the lack of trust factor is addressed in each of the 
analysed papers. Narrative is the most addressed factor – 61 (29%) out of the 158 
proposed measures. None of the documents addresses all of the factors, but COM 1, 
SCRRT 1, EUCTS, SCRRT 2 and ColSec address 8 of them. The RAN documents, in 
turn, address seven, the PPC six, COM 3 five, COM 2 four and finally, NorCOM 1 
addresses two. 
The data extracted from the measure analysis contrasts in some aspects with the 
findings of the content analysis of the policies presented in chapter 3, section 3.2.3. The 
first thing to notice is that although the word count showed the term relative deprivation 
was absent from all documents, the factor of relative deprivation is addressed in every 
policy paper except for COM 3 and NorCOM 1.  
A second observation is that the terms trust and foreign policy were absent until 
the appearance of the RAN documents. However, both factors are addressed in several 
earlier documents. Paradoxically, the foreign policy factor is not addressed in RAN. In a 
similar manner, the term narrative shows the first hit in COM 2, nonetheless chapter 4 
has shown that this factor is addressed in the previously published COM 1, SCRRT 1, 
EUCTS and SCRRT 2. 
A third point of discrepancy is that even though the word count shows that 
intervention* appears in four different documents (even though PPC does not use the 
term to mean military interventions), not a single document presents measures 
addressing this particular radicalisation factor. 
In contrast, discrimination and lack of opportunities can be pointed out as 
examples of convergence between the data gathered in chapter 3 and the analysis results 
of this chapter.  
 
4.2 Coercive Measures and the Western Liberal Democratic Conception 
Out of the 158 measures analysed in chapter 4, 23 (15.82%) have been categorised as 
“hard” or coercive. In addition to these 23 measures, two extra measures that were not 
included in the analysis – i.e. they did not address radicalisation factors in a direct 
manner – have been counted for this section because of their possible implications for 
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the western liberal democratic conception of liberties. These are the measure proposed 
in RAN calling for reformulating patient confidentiality (RAN 2012f:2) and the 
measure of ColSec calling for a “review [of] the regulations relating to duty of 
disclosure and duty of confidentiality” (NMJP 2011:30). 
In brief, COM 1 contributes to the list with two measures, the SCRRT 1 with 
five, the EUCTS with six, the SCRRT 2 with five, the RAN documents and COM 3 
provide three and two each and finally, ColSec contributes with two.  
Out of the 25 measures, 13 (60%) were proposed during 2005. In addition, when 
adding the number of coercive measures proposed in SCRRT 2 (revision of the 2005 
SCRRT 1 and closest to the first three documents in temporal terms) the number 
increases to 18 (72%). The reasons for the high concentration of coercive measures 
might be related to the historical context in which the policies were presented. As 
mentioned in chapter 3, section 3.1 COM 1, SCRRT 1 and EUCTS were published soon 
after the July 7
th
 attacks in London and the year after the Madrid attacks and the 
assassination of Theo van Gogh.  The reasons for the high number of coercive measures 
in SCRRT 2 would not be that much influenced by the historical context, but as said in 
chapter 4 for being a copy and paste revision of the SCRRT 1.  
These measures set their focus on countering different factors of the 
radicalisation process and accordingly propose different actions, and could therefore be 
divided in three different groups. In the first group could be placed measure number 1 
and 2 of the document COM 1 that call for the prohibition of broadcasts by channels 
inciting hatred on grounds of race, sex, religion or nationality (EC, 2005, p. 4) and the 
adoption of measures against internet services provided illegally in the context of 
terrorism (EC, 2005, p. 4); measure number 6 of the SCRRT 1, EUCTS and SCRRT 2 
propose creating measures to impede terrorist recruitment using the internet (CEU, 
2005a, p. 3; CEU, 2005b, p. 8; CEU, 2008, p. 4); measure number 1 of the RAN 
documents recommends encouraging internet service providers to remove and prohibit 
illegal extremist material and to collaborate with police and security agencies (RAN, 
2012a, p. 3); measures number 3 and 4 of COM 3 call for preventing extremist 
propaganda from reaching its target audience through the internet (EC, 2014, p. 8) and 
removing illegal material from the internet (EC, 2014:8). In a similar way measure 
number 5 of the SCRRT 1, EUCTS and SCRRT 2 call for the setting of a legal 
framework to prevent individuals from inciting and legitimising violence (CEU, 2005a, 
p. 3; CEU, 2005b, p. 8; CEU, 2008, p. 4), and measure number 13 of the EUCTS calls 
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for addressing incitement and recruitment in particular in key environments such as 
prisons, places of religious training or worship, by implementing legislation to make 
these behaviours offences (CEU, 2005b, p. 9). 
Without mentioning the internet factor, but focusing on the spread of extremist 
narratives through the influence that certain individuals could have, measure number 3 
of the SCRRT 1, EUCTS and SCRRT 2 calls for limiting the activities of individuals 
playing a role in radicalisation processes in prisons, places of education, religious 
training, and worship (CEU, 2005a, p. 3; CEU, 2005b, p. 8; CEU, 2008, p. 4).  
In the second group, measure number 1 of the SCRRT 1, EUCTS, SCRRT 2 and 
NorCOM 2 mentions the necessity of preventing individuals from getting access to 
terrorist training (CEU, 2005a, p. 3; CEU, 2005b, p. 8; CEU, 2008, p. 4; Amundsen  
2013) and the aforementioned proposal to monitor travelling to conflict zones made in 
measure 6 of the SCRRT 1, EUCTS and SCRRT 2 (CEU, 2005a, p. 3; CEU, 2005b, p. 
8; CEU, 2008, p. 4). 
Finally in the third group, measure number 2 of the SCRRT 1, EUCTS and 
SCRRT 2 proposes monitoring the internet and travel to conflict zones (CEU, 2005a, p. 
3; CEU, 2005b, p. 8; CEU, 2008, p. 4), measure number 1 of ColSec recommends 
improving information about regulations relating to persons who may pose a security 
risk (NMJP 2011, p. 28) and the two measures that were not included in the list analysed 
in chapter 3. The first measure is part of the RAN documents and asks for the 
reformulation of patient confidentiality (RAN, 2012f, p. 2) as a necessary step to use 
information on individuals in danger of radicalisation collected by the health sector. The 
second measure, part of ColSec, also calls for a review of the regulations relating to the 
duty of disclosure and the duty of confidentiality (NMJP 2011:30), allegedly for a 
similar purpose. And measure 22 of the RAN documents calls for supervision of the 
communications of the target group to avoid the spread of radical narratives in the 
prison realm (RAN, 2012e, p. 4). 
It can be seen that the first group encompasses the majority of the proposed hard 
measures – 60%. These measures address the narrative factor, and therefore it could 
potentially be a threat to freedom of expression. The second group could be considered 
to be in conflict with freedom of movement if one understands that terrorist training, if 
not through the internet, would most likely happen in a non-European country, and 
therefore a possible action would be prohibiting to travel to areas were this kind of 
activity exists. Three measures could be classified as part of this category – 12% of the 
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total amount. Finally, the third group could potentially be understood as conflicting with 
the right to privacy. Seven measures have been identified as part of this category, 
amounting to a 28% of the total amount of measures. 
Freedom of expression is a right guaranteed through article 19 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR): “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion 
and expression […] (UDHR, art. 19)”; article 19.2 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR): “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
expression […]” (ICCPR, art. 19.2); article 10.1 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR): “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression […]”; and article 
11.1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU): “Everyone 
has the right to freedom of expression[…] (CFREU, 11.1). 
It is possible, however, to argue against the invoking of freedom of expression to 
defend extremist narratives, using the same texts, since freedom of expression could 
potentially conflict with some of the rights of the “listener” (Mendel & Salomon 2011, 
p. 9). The ICCPR mentions in this regard through its Article 19.3 that freedom of 
expression can be,  
Subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are 
necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national 
security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals (ICCPR, art. 19.3) 
In addition, Article 20.2 of the ICCPR points out that, “Any advocacy of 
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility 
or violence shall be prohibited by law” (ICCPR, art. 20.2). In a similar fashion the 
ECHR states in article 10.2 that,  
The exercise of these freedoms […] may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions 
or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of 
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime […] 
(ECHR, art. 10.2) 
Although the UDHR and the CFREU do not mention when freedom of 
expression can be restricted, an appeal to Articles 7 and 8 of the UDHR proclaiming 
that “All [individuals] are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in 
violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination” 
(UDHR, art. 7) and that “Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the 
competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by 
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the constitution or by law” (UDHR, art. 8); and Articles 1 and 21 of CFREU stating that 
“Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected” (CFREU, art. 1) and 
that,  
Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic 
features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national 
minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited (CFREU, art. 
21) 
 This could be raised to highlight the aforementioned conflict between the rights 
of the “speaker” and the rights of the “listener”. 
The UN Human Rights Committee has stated that the restriction of freedom of 
expression must meet a three-part test: it must be provided by a clear and accessible law, 
it has to pursue one of the two aims listed in Article 19.3 of the ICCPR and the 
restriction has to be necessary to secure the end (Mendel & Salomon 2011, p. 12-13). 
The restriction of freedom of expression in certain cases and following certain 
rules does not have to be regarded as conditioning the liberties presupposed in a western 
liberal democracy. In this line, the addition of the necessity to “set a clear criteria laid 
down by law to define which content is illegal” (EC, 2005, p. 5) proposed by COM 1, in 
addition to its call for “measures against internet services provided illegally in the 
context of terrorism” (EC, 2005, p. 5), could be understood as the will of the European 
Union to comply with the western liberal democratic standards when addressing the 
restriction of freedom of expression. 
Preventing access to terrorist training per se would not pose a threat to the 
conception of what a western liberal democratic state should be, but the measures taken 
to prevent that access could. Understanding that terrorist training, if not through the 
internet, would most likely happen in a non-European country a possible action would 
be prohibiting travel to areas were this kind of activity exists. In this regard, the UDHR 
states in its Article 13.3 that “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his 
own, and to return to his country” (UDHR, 13.3). In Article 12, sections 2 and 4 of the 
ICCPR, an equal claim is also made by pointing out that “Everyone shall be free to 
leave any country, including his own” (ICCPR, art. 12.2)  and “no one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country” (ICCPR, art. 12.4). In a 
similar manner Article 2.2 of the fourth protocol of the ECHR states that “Everyone 
shall be free to leave any country, including his own […]” (ECHR, art. 2.2). 
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 As is the case with freedom of expression, freedom of movement cannot be 
considered an absolute right since the ICCPR specifies that it could be restricted if it is 
“[…] necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public), public health or 
morals or the rights and freedoms of others […]” (ICCPR, art.12.3).  
As it happens with the aforementioned restriction on freedom of expression, the 
restriction of movement should, according to Article 12.3, be provided by law and in 
consonance with the rest of the rights presented in the Covenant. 
Restricting freedom of movement, in a similar fashion to the restriction of 
freedom of expression, does not necessarily have to be considered as jeopardising the 
standards of a western liberal democracy as long as it complies with the requirements 
expressed in the aforementioned articles. 
Monitoring the internet, improving the information about persons who may pose 
a security risk, reformulating patient confidentiality and reviewing the regulations 
relating to the duty of disclosure and the duty of confidentiality are presented in SCRRT 
1, EUCTS, SCRRT 2, the RAN documents and ColSec as appropriate tools for 
enhancing counter-radicalisation initiatives. 
 As mentioned before, these particular measures could pose a challenge to the 
rights of privacy and confidentiality present in Article 12 of the UDHR: “No one shall 
be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence 
[…]” (UDHR, art. 12); Article 17, sections 1 and 2 of the ICCPR: “No one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence” (ICCPR, art. 17.1) and “Everyone has the right to the protection of the 
law against such interference or attacks” (ICCPR, art. 17.2); Article 8.1 of ECHR: 
“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence” (ECHR, art. 8.1); and Article 8.1 of the CFREU: “Everyone has the 
right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her” (CFREU, art. 8.1). The 
Norwegian constitution does not have any specific provision dealing with the right to 
privacy, but Article 110, section c. mentions that “It is the responsibility of the 
authorities of the State to respect and ensure human rights. Specific provisions for the 
implementation of treaties thereon shall be determined by Law” (Norwegian 
Constitution art. 110). This added to the incorporation of the ECHR and the ICCPR 
inter alia, into Norwegian law (although not constitutional status), makes the previously 
mentioned articles applicable to Norway (Bygrave & Aarø 2001, p. 333). 
It can be said that the right to privacy is part of the western liberal democratic 
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conception, but in a similar way to the previously discussed rights, it is not absolute. 
Article 8.2 of the ECHR points out that,  
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as 
is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others (ECHR, 8.2).  
Similarly, CFREU mentions in Article 8.2 that personal data, such as that 
collected by the health institutions,  
[…] must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person 
concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to 
data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified (CFREU, 
8.2). 
 As with the previously discussed freedoms, the right to privacy can be 
conditioned, according to the ECHR, if it is in the interests of inter alia, national 
security or the preservation of law and order. In this case, however, the mechanisms to 
control the restrictions laid down by CFREU, the possibility of this measures not being 
in line with the undermining of the liberties presupposed in a western liberal democracy 
could be considered. 
To sum up, when discussing the compliance of the proposed hard measures with 
the presupposed liberties of a western liberal democracy the UDHR, ICCPR, ECHR and 
the CFREU can be used to argue both positions. Without further entering into a legal 
discussion or diving into the concept of securitisation proposed by Ole Wæver, one 
could say that at the very least these hard measures could potentially undermine 
society's trust in the political system, one of the contributing factors to the radicalisation 
process presented in Chapter 2.  
The frequency of hard measures and trust building measures, taking all the 
policy papers into account, showed no correlation r(11) = -.17, p > .61. When taking 
only the action plans into account i.e. the SCRRT 1, EUCTS, SCRRT 2, ColSec and 
PPC, however, Pearson’s r analysis showed a strong negative relationship between the 
amount of hard measures and trust building measures, r(5) = -.97, p < .01. 
 
4.3 On the effectiveness of counter-radicalisation policies 
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As it was advanced in Chapter 1, section 1.2.4, a statement on the effectiveness of the 
proposed policies was not made with the notion that policies and their effectiveness 
have crisp boundaries, i.e. either it is effective or it is not. On the contrary, the 
effectiveness of the policies was considered as having a certain degree of membership 
to the effectiveness notion using fuzzy set methodology. The degree of membership can 
be easily calculated by ascribing the value 0 to the policies that do not have any 
measures addressing the proposed factors, and the value 1 to the policies that address all 
nine factors, and finally calculating the value of the remaining policies ascribing them a 
number between 0 and 1.  
COM 1, SCRRT 1, EUCTS, SCRRT 2 and ColSec address eight of the nine 
proposed factors, and therefore it could be said they have a 0.89 grade of membership in 
the effectiveness notion. The RAN documents address seven of the factors which would 
make its grade of membership 0.78, whilst the PPC addresses six factors amounting to a 
0.67 grade of membership. COM 3 addresses five, giving it a grade of 0.56, and COM 2 
and NorCOM 2 address four factors respectively, which translates to a 0.45 grade 
membership. Finally, NorCOM 1 addresses two factors, giving it a membership grade of 
0.23. With this the first research question - to what extent do the counter-radicalisation 
policies presented in the EU, Norway and the Autonomous Region of the Basque 
Country address the contributing factors of the radicalisation process? – is answered. 
As for the second question - to what extent do the counter-radicalisation policies 
presented in the EU, Norway and the Autonomous Region of the Basque Country 
guarantee the liberties surmised in a western liberal democracy? – section 4.2 has 
argued that the 25 identified hard measures do not necessarily conflict with the liberties 
presupposed in a western liberal democracy when three points are respected: it must be 
provided by a clear and accessible law, it has to pursue one of the two aims listed in 
Article 19.3 of the ICCPR and the restriction has to be necessary to secure the end 
(Mendel & Salomon 2011, p. 12-13). The same section has argued, however, that these 
measures could stir the lack of trust in the political system factor, and therefore potential 
radicalising qualities of hard countermeasures have to be taken into account in order to 
calibrate the effectiveness values ascribed to the policy papers. When understanding the 
existence of these measures as a 1 and the absence as a 0, and applying the same 
gradation system used before for ascribing effectiveness membership values COM 1, 
SCRRT 1, EUCTS, SCRRT 2, RAN, COM 3, ColSec and NorCOM 2 would be 
considered as having an exacerbation value of 0.11. 
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Although the result of the calibration could be offered through a single 
numerical cipher, in order to not obscure the result of the effectiveness, the following 
scatter plot is presented showing the positioning of each one of the policy documents in 
respect to the grade of membership of effectiveness calculated taking into account the 
overlapping between the proposed measures and the contributing factors of 















4.4 Wrapping up Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 has analysed the overlapping between the proposed measures of the policy 
papers presented in the previous chapter and the contributing factors selected in Chapter 
2. The findings have been presented in a truth table (section 4.1.10) that shows that 
there is not a complete overlapping between the measures proposed in any of the 
analysed policy documents and the contributing factors of the radicalisation process. 
This chapter has also identified 25 measures that could potentially pose a threat to the 
presupposed liberties of a western liberal democracy. The chapter has also delved into 
the implications that these measures could have in respect to the liberties surmised in a 
western liberal democracy, and has argued that the measures do not necessarily conflict 
with the liberties when three points are respected: it must be provided by a clear and 
accessible law, it has to pursue one of the two aims listed in Article 19.3 of the ICCPR 
and the restriction has to be necessary to secure the end (Mendel & Salomon 2011, p. 
12-13). It has been argued, however, that these types of measures could enhance the 
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lack of trust factor. 
Finally, section 4.3 of this chapter has answered the proposed research questions 
presented in Chapter 1, section 1.1, of to what extent do the counter-radicalisation 
policies presented in the EU, Norway and the Autonomous Region of the Basque 
Country address the contributing factors of the radicalisation process? And to what 
extent do the counter-radicalisation policies presented in the EU, Norway and the 
Autonomous Region of the Basque Country guarantee the liberties surmised in a 
western liberal democracy? In addition, the potential radicalising qualities of hard 
countermeasures have been taken into account in order to calibrate the effectiveness 















This study has examined the effectiveness of 11 counter-radicalisation policies 
presented by the European Union, Norway, and the Autonomous Region of the Basque 
Country in Spain. 
In order to facilitate the analysis on the effectiveness of the policies, the study 
adopted the premise that for a counter-radicalisation policy to be effective it has to 
address the contributing factors of the radicalisation processes and it has to be context 
specific, i.e. maintaining the liberties presupposed in a western liberal democracy. 
Following this premise, the study has been guided by two research questions: to what 
extent do the counter-radicalisation policies presented in the EU, Norway and the 
Autonomous Region of the Basque Country address the contributing factors of the 
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radicalisation process? And to what extent do the counter-radicalisation policies 
presented in the EU, Norway and the Autonomous Region of the Basque Country 
guarantee the liberties surmised in a western liberal democracy? (see Chapter 1, section 
1.1). 
In the process of answering these questions, the study has first, proposed a 
conceptualisation of the phenomenon of radicalisation based on previous scholarly 
research on the subject (see Chapter 2). Second, it has analysed the language used 
through the documents (see Chapter 3, section 3.2). Third, it has identified a total of 158 
measures (see Appendix C). Fourth, it has analysed the overlapping between the 
proposed measures and the contributing factors of radicalisation (See Chapter 4, section 
4.1). Fifth, it has discussed the implications that 25 of the identified measures could 
have to the presupposed liberties of a western liberal democracy (see Chapter 4, section 
4.2), and sixth, it has defined the effectiveness of the aforementioned policy documents 
(see Chapter 4, section 4.3).  
 
5.1 Main Findings 
The first main finding of the study is the grade of membership in the 
effectiveness notion of the 11 counter-radicalisation policies. In this manner COM 1, 
SCRRT 1, EUCTS, SCRRT 2 and ColSec have a 0.89 grade of membership in the 
effectiveness notion and a grade of membership of 0.11 in the exacerbation notion. The 
RAN documents have a grade of membership 0.78 in effectiveness and a grade of 
membership of 0.11 in exacerbation. The PPC has a grade of membership of 0.67 in 
effectiveness. COM 3 has a grade of membership of 0.56 in effectiveness and a grade of 
membership of 0.11 in exacerbation. COM 2 and NorCOM 2 have a grade of 
membership of 0.45. In addition NorCOM 2 has grade of membership of 0.11 in 
exacerbation, and finally, NorCOM 1 has a grade of membership of 0.23.  
The second main finding is that the policy documents are context specific. This 
statement is the result of two reasons. The first one is that only a 15.82 % of the 
measures could be classified as having the potential to threat the presupposed liberties 
of a western liberal democracy. The second one is that the same documents that define 
the presupposed liberties open a door for reducing those same rights and freedoms. 
In addition to the main findings the content analysis of the 11 policy documents 
has shown a reduction in the use of hard terms such as terrorist*, combat* and fight* 
and an increase in the softer descriptors radical*, extremist*, prevent*, counter* and 
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address*; a downward tendency in the use of words that identify Muslims as the 
receiving group of these policies; that COM 1 focuses on the contributing factors at the 
social level, the SCRRT 1, SCRRT 2 and COM 2 focus on a combination of social and 
individual contributing factors and the EUCTS, RAN and COM 3 focus mainly on the 
individual level, NorCOM 1 focuses on the external level contributing factors, NorCOM 
2 focuses on the social level, ColSec sets a similar focus on all three levels and PPC, 
stresses the social and the external levels; and finally,  that at the very least, the three 
longest documents, RAN, ColSec and PPC could be defined as being in consonance 
with the western liberal democratic discourse. 
 
5.2 Challenges and Future Research Proposals 
This paper has considered the radicalisation of second and third generation Muslims in 
Europe. In this manner, possible contributing factors to the phenomenon have been 
proposed, measures presented in the selected policy papers have been identified, and the 
overlapping between the two has been analysed in order to discern the degree of 
membership these policy papers hold regarding the notion of effectiveness. In addition, 
the potential radicalising qualities of the hard measures proposed in some of the 
documents have been evaluated in an attempt to calibrate the aforementioned degree of 
membership. However, this papers has not considered the potential radicalising qualities 
that some of the soft measures could have in respect of other sectors of society, e.g. the 
RAN documents propose, in their measure number 39 and 40 to highlight the 
experience of disillusioned foreign fighters returning home (RAN, 2012g, p. 6) and to 
utilise the voice of “formers” to de-construct narratives (RAN, 2012g, p. 7), which 
could radicalise members of the civil society such as victim organisations. On the 
contrary, the hard measures that have been classified as potentially exacerbating the 
radicalisation process of the focus group of this study and their milieu, could act as 
countering the radicalisation of victim organisations. 
A second point that was not taken into account in this study is how the different 
measures addressing a contributing factor in different documents influence the degree of 
membership in the effectiveness notion of those policy papers. Although this study has 
avoided using crisp boundaries to define the effectiveness of the policy papers it has 
used them to determine the overlapping between contributing factors and proposed 
measures. In this way, both RAN, with 25 measures addressing the narrative factor, and 
COM 2, with only one, have been ascribed the value 1 due to the existence of 
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overlapping. The possibility of a more in-depth qualitative analysis and subsequent use 
of fuzzy set methodology to determine the degree of membership in the notion of 
overlapping could offer a more nuanced image of the ultimate degree of membership on 
the effectiveness notion that each policy paper holds. 
These two points could encourage further research to present a more nuanced 
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STATE 436 11,5% 1,4% 0,7% 6 100,0% 
LAW 324 8,6% 1,0% 0,5% 6 100,0% 
PUBLIC 288 7,6% 0,9% 0,4% 6 100,0% 
RIGHTS 277 7,3% 0,9% 0,4% 6 100,0% 
GENERAL 219 5,8% 0,7% 0,3% 6 100,0% 
MEMBERS 209 5,5% 0,7% 0,3% 6 100,0% 
PROTECTION 132 3,5% 0,4% 0,2% 6 100,0% 
ACCORDANCE 131 3,5% 0,4% 0,2% 6 100,0% 
FREEDOM 130 3,4% 0,4% 0,2% 6 100,0% 
CASE 117 3,1% 0,4% 0,2% 6 100,0% 
ACT 103 2,7% 0,3% 0,2% 6 100,0% 
HUMAN  95 2,5% 0,3% 0,1% 6 100,0% 
MEMBER  90 2,4% 0,3% 0,1% 6 100,0% 
TIME  86 2,3% 0,3% 0,1% 6 100,0% 
RESPECT  81 2,1% 0,3% 0,1% 6 100,0% 
PERSON  81 2,1% 0,3% 0,1% 6 100,0% 
EXERCISE  78 2,1% 0,2% 0,1% 6 100,0% 
NATIONS  78 2,1% 0,2% 0,1% 6 100,0% 
INTERNATIONAL  77 2,0% 0,2% 0,1% 6 100,0% 
FREE  73 1,9% 0,2% 0,1% 6 100,0% 
CRIMINAL  70 1,9% 0,2% 0,1% 6 100,0% 
POLITICAL  68 1,8% 0,2% 0,1% 6 100,0% 
ORDER  67 1,8% 0,2% 0,1% 6 100,0% 
ENTITLED  65 1,7% 0,2% 0,1% 6 100,0% 
PRINCIPLES  65 1,7% 0,2% 0,1% 6 100,0% 
ECONOMIC  63 1,7% 0,2% 0,1% 6 100,0% 
DATE  58 1,5% 0,2% 0,1% 6 100,0% 
ELECTIONS  58 1,5% 0,2% 0,1% 6 100,0% 
VOTE  53 1,4% 0,2% 0,1% 6 100,0% 














ENGLISH SPANISH NORWEGIAN 
radical radical radikal 
radicalism radicalismo radikalisme  
radicalisation radicalización radikalisering 
violent radical radical violento voldelig radikal 
violent radicalisation radicalización violenta voldelig radikalisering 
extremist extremista ekstremist 
extremism extremismo ekstremisme 
violent extremist extremista violento voldelig ekstremist 
violent extremism extremismo violento voldelig ekstremisme 
terrorist terrorista terrorist 
terrorism terrorismo terrorisme  
counter contrarrestar motvirke 
countering contrarrestando motvirker 
prevent prevenir forebygge 
preventing previniendo forebygger 
prevention prevención forebygging 
address abordar adressere 
addressing abordando adresserer  
combat combatir bekjempe 
combating combatiendo bekjemper 
fight lucha kamp 
fighting luchando kjempe 
islam islam Islam 
islamist islamista islamist 
islamism islamismo Islamisme 
muslim musulmán Muslim 
psychopathology psicopatología psykopatologi 
psychopathologies psicopatologías psykopatologier  
psychopathological psicopatológico psykopatologisk 
identity identidad identitet 
identities identidades identiteter 
belonging pertenencia tilhørighet 
stigmatisation estigmatización stigmatisering 
discrimination discriminación diskriminering 
opportunity oportunidad mulighet 
opportunities oportunidades muligheter 
trust confianza tillitt 
relative deprivation privación relativa relativ berøvelse 
narrative narrativa narrativ 
narratives narrativas narrativer 
network red nettverk 
networks redes nettverk 
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foreign policy política exterior utenrikspolitikk 
intervention intervención intervensjon 
interventions Intervenciones intervensjoner 
state estado stat 
law ley lov 
public público offentlig 
rights derechos rettigheter 
human humanos menneske 
protection protección beskyttelse 
freedom libertad frihet 
respect respeto respekt 
person persona person 









Appendix C  





radical 12 2 1 3 1 8 4 0 4 0 1 
radicalism 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 
radicalisation 9 12 6 17 8 138 66 2 95 7 0 
violent 
radicalisation 37 1 0 1 0 17 0 0 0 0 0 
violent radical 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
extremist 2 2 2 2 2 28 17 0 20 0 0 
extremism 2 2 1 3 0 11 2 0 7 2 0 
violent extremism 0 0 0 0 1 80 18 2 77 1 0 
terrorist 31 7 5 8 3 7 8 0 24 0 0 
terrorism 31 22 10 22 5 24 25 12 42 2 32 
counter 1 4 3 4 2 87 19 1 15 0 0 
countering 0 2 1 2 0 6 9 1 1 0 0 
prevent 3 3 4 3 2 26 18 1 62 2 4 
preventing 4 1 1 2 0 25 14 0 17 0 0 
prevention 3 0 0 0 3 23 5 6 67 5 9 
address 6 1 2 1 1 14 5 1 3 0 8 
addressing 6 2 1 2 0 3 5 0 0 1 0 
combat 3 1 0 2 1 0 3 0 4 0 1 
combating 3 3 3 4 0 3 2 0 3 0 0 
fight 6 0 0 0 0 5 2 6 3 2 1 
fighting 5 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 
islam 9 4 1 0 0 3 0 0 2 0 0 
islamist 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
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islamism 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 
muslim 2 5 0 0 0 8 0 0 2 0 0 
psychopathology 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
psychopathologies 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
psychopathological 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
identity 10 1 0 1 0 3 0 0 5 0 0 
identities 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 
belonging 3 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 3 0 
stigmatisation 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
discrimination 5 1 1 1 0 3 0 0 15 0 0 
opportunity 0 2 0 2 1 4 0 0 4 2 3 
opportunities 2 1 1 1 0 8 3 0 9 0 3 
trust 0 0 0 0 0 10 1 1 6 0 16 
relative 
deprivation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
narrative 0 0 0 0 0 41 0 0 0 0 4 
narratives 0 0 0 0 2 62 6 0 0 0 0 
network 3 0 0 0 3 17 3 0 9 0 17 
networks 8 3 0 4 0 7 3 0 5 0 1 
foreign policy 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 1 11 0 0 
intervention 0 0 0 0 0 15 1 0 4 0 2 
interventions 0 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 
state 9 1 1 1 0 25 4 0 5 0 4 
law 10 0 0 0 1 6 4 1 15 0 9 
public 6 0 0 2 0 32 3 4 28 0 11 
rights 12 2 1 2 0 3 4 1 11 0 133 
human 9 1 1 1 0 7 1 2 7 0 127 
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protection 3 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 5 0 5 
freedom 3 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 9 0 4 
respect 3 1 0 1 0 6 3 0 11 0 14 
person 1 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 14 0 5 






1. Prohibition of broadcast to channels inciting to hatred on grounds of race, sex, 
religion or nationality (EC, 2005, p. 4). 
2. Adopt measures against internet services provided illegally in the context of 
terrorism (EC, 2005, p. 4). 
a. Set clear criteria laid down by law to define which content is illegal (EC, 
2005, p. 5). 
3. Create and support programmes promoting cultural diversity, intercultural 
dialogue, European common values, respect for human rights and to combat 
racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia (EC, 2005, p. 5). 
4. Develop the concept of European citizenship and intercultural understanding 
(EC, p. 2005:5-6). 
5. Promote integration and work in the prevention of the double sense of non-
belonging (EC, 2005, p. 6) 
a. Take a holistic approach to deal with integration not only promoting 
access to the labour market, but also taking social, cultural, religious, 
linguistic and national nuances into account (EC, 2005, p. 6). 
6. Promote non-discrimination as a key aspect of integration (EC, 2005, p. 6). 
7. Promote equal opportunities for disadvantaged groups. Improve housing 
conditions, encourage access to education, regenerate deprived areas and make 
them more accessible, facilitate the access to the job market and strengthen the 
protection from social exclusion (EC, 2005, p. 6-7). 
8. Promote interfaith dialogue and between the state and religion (EC, 2005, p. 7). 
9. Promote the engagement of the police at the local level, especially with the 
youth (EC, 2005, p. 7). 
10. Offer assistance to third countries in order to reduce inequalities, support 
democratization and promote human rights (EC, 2005, p. 9). 
11. Promote cultural and inter-religious understanding between Europe and third 
countries (EC, 2005, p. 9). 
SCRRT 1 
1. Foment community policing (CEU, 2005a, p. 3). 
2. Monitor internet and travel to conflict zones (CEU, 2005a, p. 3). 
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3. Limit the activities of those playing a role in radicalisation in prisons, places of 
education, religious training, and worship (CEU, 2005a, p. 3). 
4. Prevent individuals from getting access to terrorist training (CEU, 2005a, p. 3). 
5. Set a legal framework to prevent individuals from inciting and legitimising 
violence (CEU, 2005a, p. 3). 
6. Create measures to impede terrorist recruitment using the Internet (CEU, 2005a, 
p. 3). 
7. Pursue political dialogue (CEU, 2005a, p. 3). 
8. Empower moderate voices by engaging with Muslim organisations and faith 
groups (CEU, 2005a, p. 4). 
9. Support the availability of mainstream literature (CEU, 2005a, p. 4). 
10. Encourage the emergence of European imams and enhance language and other 
training for foreign imams in Europe (CEU, 2005a, p. 4). 
11. Change the perceptions of European and Western policies particularly among 
Muslim communities (CEU, 2005a, p. 4). 
12. Correct unfair or inaccurate perceptions of Islam and Muslims (CEU, 2005a, p. 
4). 
13. Develop a non-emotive lexicon for discussing the issues in order to avoid linking 
Islam to terrorism (CEU, 2005a, p. 4). 
a. Ensure that policies do not exacerbate division (CEU, 2005a, p. 4) 
14. Eliminate structural factors that prompt radicalisation processes. 
b. Lack of political and economic prospects, unresolved international and 
domestic strife; and inadequate and inappropriate education, cultural 
opportunities for young people or identity issues (CEU, 2005a, p. 4). 
15. Target inequalities and discrimination (CEU, 2005a, p. 5). 
16. Promote inter-cultural dialogue and debate (CEU, 2005a, p. 5). 
17. Promote long term integration (CEU, 2005a, p. 5). 
18. Promote good governance, human rights, democracy, education and economic 
prosperity outside the union, and engage in conflict resolution in third countries 
(CEU, 2005a, p. 5). 
EUCTS 
1. Foment community policing (CEU, 2005b, p. 8). 
2. Monitor internet and travel to conflict zones (CEU, 2005b, p. 8). 
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3. Limit the activities of those playing a role in radicalisation in prisons, places of 
education, religious training, and worship (CEU, 2005b, p. 8). 
4. Prevent individuals from getting access to terrorist training (CEU, 2005b, p. 8). 
5. Set a legal framework to prevent individuals from inciting and legitimising 
violence (CEU, 2005b, p. 8). 
6. Create measures to impede terrorist recruitment using the Internet (CEU, 2005b, 
p. 8). 
7. Develop a non-emotive lexicon to discuss these issues (CEU, 2005b, p. 8). 
a. Ensure that policies do not exacerbate division (CEU, 2005b, p. 8). 
8. Eliminate structural factors that prompt radicalisation processes. 
a. Lack of political or economic prospects and of educational opportunities 
(CEU, 2005b, p. 9). 
9. Promote good governance, human rights, democracy, education and economic 
prosperity outside the union, and engage in conflict resolution in third countries 
(CEU, 2005b, p. 9) 
10. Target inequalities and discrimination (CEU, 2005b, p. 9). 
11. Promote inter-cultural dialogue and debate both nationally and internationally 
(CEU, 2005b, p. 9). 
12. Promote long term integration (CEU, 2005b, p. 9). 
13. Address incitement and recruitment in particular in key environments, for 
example prisons, places of religious training or worship, notably by 
implementing legislation making these behaviours offences (CEU, 2005b, p. 9). 
SCRRT 2 
1. Foment community policing (CEU, 2008, p. 4). 
2. Monitor internet and travel to conflict zones (CEU, 2008, p. 4). 
3. Limit the activities of those playing a role in radicalisation in prisons, places of 
education, religious training, and worship (CEU, 2008, p. 4). 
4. Prevent individuals from getting access to terrorist training (CEU, 2008, p. 4). 
5. Set a legal framework to prevent individuals from inciting and legitimising 
violence (CEU, 2008, p. 4). 
6. Create measures to impede terrorist recruitment using the Internet (CEU, 2008, p. 
4). 
7. Pursue political dialogue (CEU, 2008, p. 4). 
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8. Empower mainstream voices by stepping up the dialogue with political, religious 
and separatist groups which favour moderation and exclude recourse to violence 
(CEU, 2008, p. 5). 
9. Change the perceptions of European and Western policies (CEU, 2008, p. 5). 
10. Develop a non-emotive lexicon for discussing the issues in order to avoid linking 
religion to terrorism (CEU, 2008, p. 5). 
a. Ensure that policies do not exacerbate division (CEU, 2008, p. 5). 
11. Eliminate structural factors that prompt radicalisation processes. 
a. Lack of political and economic prospects, unresolved international and 
domestic strife; and inadequate and inappropriate education, cultural 
opportunities for young people or identity issues (CEU, 2008, p. 5). 
12. Target inequalities and discrimination (CEU, 2008, p. 5). 
13. Promote inter-cultural dialogue and debate (CEU, 2008, p. 5). 
14. Promote long term integration (CEU, 2008, p. 5). 
15. External economic policies (CEU, 2008, p. 5). 
16. Promote good governance, human rights, democracy, education and economic 
prosperity outside the union, and engage in conflict resolution in third countries 
(CEU, 2008, p. 5). 
COM 2 
1. Promote close cooperation between local authorities and civil society (EC, 2010, 
p. 7). 
2. Empower key groups in vulnerable communities (EC, 2010, p. 7). 
3. Developed local community-based approaches and prevention policies (EC, 
2010, p. 7). 
4. Support the work of civil society organisations exposing, translating and 
challenging violent extremist propaganda on the internet (EC, 2010, p. 8). 
The RAN documents 
1. Encourage internet service providers to remove and prohibit illegal extremist 
material and to collaborate with police and security agencies (RAN, 2012a, p. 
3). 
2. Utilise consistent counter-messaging across the EU to discredit the radicaliser´s 
rhetoric (RAN, 2012a, p. 3). 
3. Encourage educationalists to introduce better programs of learning to promote 
“critical thinking” by young people (RAN, 2012a, p. 3). 
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4. Support the message of victims of terrorism and make them part of the counter-
narrative (RAN, 2012b, p. 3). 
5. Capacitate victims and associations of victims to bring counter-radicalisation 
narratives inside state funded institutions, such as schools (RAN, 2012b, p. 3). 
6. Use testimonies of victims culturally close to the target group (RAN, 2012b, p. 
4). 
7. Assist and support victims in countering extremist narratives in the internet and 
social media (RAN, 2012b, p. 4). 
8. Refine counter-narratives taking into account the audience, the messenger, the 
context, and the message (RAN, 2012c, p. 6). 
9. Fund messengers to increase their capacity, and the effectiveness of the counter-
narratives (RAN, 2012c, p. 6). 
10. Promote early interventions in schools, youth groups and community settings to 
challenge racism and social exclusion (RAN, 2012d, p. 2). 
11. Empower local actors and experts instead of “parachuting” experts (RAN, 
2012d, p. 3). 
12. Involve NGOs, civil society organisations and local actors in the counter-
radicalisation efforts and fund their initiatives (RAN, 2012d, p. 3, 4). 
a. Promote multi-agency. NGOs and civil society organisations should be 
considered as significant partners by the statutory sector (RAN, 2012d, p. 4). 
13. Produce and support well researched and context-dependent counter-narratives, 
and present a clear guidance on how to deliver it (RAN, 2012d, p. 5). 
14. Involve “formers” in awareness campaigns (RAN, 2012d, p. 5). 
15. Promote discussion, and allow criticism of foreign and domestic policy (RAN, 
2012d, p. 6). 
16. Launch targeted programmes to deal with institutional prejudices (RAN, 2012d, 
p. 7). 
17. Monitor Security forces and develop a guide to help them (RAN, 2012d, p. 7). 
18. Improve the “digital literacy” of the youngsters in order to make them more 
resistant to online and social media propaganda (RAN, 2012d, p. 9). 
19. Promote active interaction between prisoners and staff to enhance security and 
gain access to other sources of information (RAN 2012e, p. 3). 
20. Lower the number of factors which could lead to grievances (RAN, 2012e, p. 3). 
21. Let in moderate versions of religion (RAN, 2012e, p. 3). 
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22. Supervision on communication of the target group to avoid the spread of radical 
narratives (RAN, 2012e, p. 4). 
23. Use community policing approach to protect the individual in the pre-criminal 
space (RAN, 2012f, p. 2). 
a. Favour a multi-agency approach with the police and other public sector 
services as equal partners to promote a holistic approach (RAN, 2012f, p. 
2). 
24. Empower migrants, minority groups, and individuals in vulnerable situations and 
make them feel included rather than excluded in terms of public services (RAN, 
2012f, p. 4). 
25. Avoid collectively labelling communities (RAN, 2012g, p. 3). 
26. Deconstruct extremist narratives using linguistics and acknowledgeable scholar 
in de- and counter-radicalisation (RAN, 2012g, p. 4). 
27. Identify counter-radicalisation actors and facilitate exchange platforms of 
religious authority figures (RAN, 2012g, p. 4). 
28. Establish support networks of women and families of foreign fighters (RAN, 
2012g, p. 4). 
a. Promote women groups cross border connections (RAN, 2012g, p. 5). 
29. Develop educational material and promote youth, and school level, exchanges to 
tackle perceptions of an idealised homeland and conflict (RAN, 2012g, p. 4). 
30. Provide psychological counselling to traumatised families and youth (RAN, 
2012g, p. 4). 
31. Enhance parenting skills of Diaspora and communication skills between parents 
and the second generation (RAN, 2012g, p. 5). 
32. Foster youth entrepreneurship and exchanges (RAN, 2012g, p. 5). 
33. Engage dialogue and cooperation between Somali clan elders. religious 
authorities and police (RAN, 2012g, p. 5) 
34. Undertake strategies for making intolerance unacceptable (RAN, 2012g, p. 5). 
a. Avoid framing diaspora communities as problems or assigning them 
blame (RAN, 2012g, p. 5) 
35. Reclaim extremist appropriated terminology (RAN, 2012g, p. 5). 




37. Work with media agencies to produce material to reach target audiences (RAN, 
2012g, p. 6). 
38. Develop national public forums debating foreign policy and provide a public 
outlet for grievances (RAN, 2012g, p. 6). 
39. Highlight the experience of disillusioned foreign fighters returning home (RAN, 
2012g, p. 6). 
40. Utilise the voice of formers to de-construct narratives (RAN, 2012g, p. 7). 
41. Teach children about democratic values, history and critical thinking (RAN, 
2013, p. 2).  
42. Involve NGOs more in prevention of radicalisation (RAN, 2013, p. 2). 
43. Increase the dialogue with and the support to Diaspora communities (RAN, 
2013, p. 2). 
44. Establish support networks for families of prospective and departed foreign 
fighters (RAN, 2013, p. 3). 
45. Engage formers to deconstruct extremist narratives (RAN, 2013, p. 3). 
46. Develop more targeted counter-narrative actions (RAN, 2013, p. 3). 
47. Support local actors in developing counter-narratives (RAN, 2013, p. 3). 
48. Prepare for de-stigmatising communication by authorities following an attack to 
avoid stigmatisation (RAN, 2013, p. 3) 
COM 3 
1. Involve NGOs, front line workers, security services, civil society, and experts in 
prevention initiatives (EC, 2014, p. 4). 
2. Put emphasis in trust building (EC, 2014, p. 4). 
3. Prevent extremist propaganda from reaching its target audience through the 
internet (EC, 2014, p. 8). 
4. Remove illegal material from the internet (EC, 2014, p. 8). 
5. Spread a positive and carefully focused message to counter extremist 
propaganda (EC, 2014, p. 8). 
6. Encourage young people to think critically about extremist messages (EC, 2014, 
p. 9). 
7. Encourage intercultural dialogue and personal exchanges between young people 




8. Support local community groups working with former violent extremists and 
with victims of extremist violence to show young people the other side of the 
story (EC, 2014, p. 10). 
9. Offer support to Member States, third countries, the private sector, civil society, 
and individuals in their efforts to create a positive online counter-narrative (EC, 
2014, p. 8). 
10. Encourage community groups, citizens, victims, and former extremist to develop 
counter-narratives (EC, 2014, p. 8). 
11. Empower victims and fund projects that enable them to tell their stories (EC, 
2014, p. 9). 
12. Promote initiatives in third countries and make sure that the internal and external 
dimensions of counter-radicalisation are well connected (EC, 2014, p. 11). 
NorCOM 1 
1. Tolerate any views and opinions and fight them with democratic methods and 
intellectual weapons when necessary (Thorshaug, 2011). 
2. Promote preventive talks by the police (Thorshaug, 2011). 
3. Strengthened dialogue, openness and public debate in the fight against terror 
(Thorshaug, 2011). 
4. Make the national threat assessments public to avoid suspicion and fear from 
parts of the population (Thorshaug, 2011). 
5. Build confidence and establishing trust and contact between the government and 
civil society (Thorshaug, 2011). 
ColSec 
1. Better the information about regulations relating to persons who may pose a 
security risk (NMJP, 2011:28). 
2. Revise the government´s crisis communication strategy (NMJP, 2011:29). 
3. Revise the communication strategy of the ministry of justice and the police 
(NMJP, 2011:31) 
4. Establish meeting places for dialogue and contact between representatives of 
civil society and public authorities centrally and locally (NMJP, 2011:31). 
5. Set courses in Norwegian social conditions for religious leaders with immigrant 
background (NMJP, 2011:31). 
6. Set courses in Norwegian social studies and understanding democracy for newly 
arrived immigrants (NMJP, 2011:32. 
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7. Push international dialogue and foreign policy work (NMJP, 2011:32). 
8. Promotion of dialogue and freedom of expression between police and immigrant 
organisations (NMJP, 2011:32). 
9. Continue to develop police preventive talks (NMJP, 2011:33). 
10. Strengthen and define the role of the Norwegian National Housing Bank in the 
local authorities´ plan work through co-operation with the police councils 
(NMJP, 2011:33). 
11. Work towards getting more people to complete their secondary school education 
(NMJP, 2011:34). 
12. Continue working on initiatives specially targeted at unemployed young people 
(NMJP, 2011:34). 
13. Strengthen the offers of faith group programmes for inmates (NMJP, 2011:34). 
NorCOM 2 
1. Prevent the internet from been a venue for recruitment and radicalisation 
(Amundsen, 2013). 
2. Consider regulatory changes that could help preventing exit, such as confiscation 
of passports, in situations where risk of radicalisation exists (Amundsen, 2013). 
3. Work for creating a sense of belonging putting special attention in the youth 
(Amundsen, 2013). 
4. Strengthen the cooperation with minority communities and municipalities 
(Amundsen, 2013). 
5. Encourage the development of an open bottom-up strategy to counter 
radicalisation (Amundsen, 2013). 
6. Establish mechanisms to offer an alternative to informing the police about 
radicalisation (Amundsen, 2013). 
PPC 
1. Promote an education system based in the notion of human rights as opposed to 
sexism, xenophobia, racism or violence (SGPC, 2013:30). 
2. Make use of the media to launch campaigns promoting the goals of the 
programme (SGPC, 2013:31). 
3. Promote the creation of new narratives through social debate in relation to social 
and political traumatic experiences (SGPC, 2013:38). 
4. Create a public space for social debate (SGPC, 2013:38). 
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5. Remember and remind what terrorisms has been both in the local and global 
context (SGPC, 2013:40). 
6. Delegitimise the use of violence as a mean to pursue goals (SGPC, 2013:40). 
7. Recognise and empower the victims of illicit counter-terrorism operations, 
putting a special emphasis on victims of torture (SGPC, 2013:44, 46). 
8. Enhance the communication channels between public institutions and the civil 
society (SGPC, 2013:50). 
9. Design and promote a prisoner reintegration programme (SGPC, 2013:52). 
10. Reaffirm the approach between police and the civil society (SGPC, 2013:60). 
11. Develop a strategy to ensure that collaboration between social groups and the 
government is not broken in difficult situations (SGPC, 2013:64). 
12. Encourage the civil society to contribute with suggestions, criticisms and 
opinions regarding the programme (SGPC, 2013:66). 
13. Promote and support initiatives within the civil society (SGPC, 2013:68). 
14. Use victim testimonies to create awareness in schools (SGPC, 2013:70). 
15. Listen to the experiences of the youth regarding peace and coexistence (SGPC, 
2013:72). 
16. Promote the notions of peace, coexistence and inter-culturalism among the youth 
and equip them with the necessary tools to deal with conflict in a constructive 
way (SGPC, 2013:72). 
17. Promote creativity, entrepreneurship and social innovation among youth in order 
to develop projects regarding peace and coexistence (SGPC, 2013:72). 
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N 11 11 11 11 11 
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Sig. (bilateral) ,009 ,000 ,044 ,133  
N 11 11 11 11 11 
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Correlación de Pearson ,748
**
 ,511 ,455 ,738
**
 ,247 
Sig. (bilateral) ,008 ,108 ,160 ,010 ,464 
N 11 11 11 11 11 
combat 
Correlación de Pearson ,463 ,382 ,826
**
 ,135 ,483 
Sig. (bilateral) ,151 ,247 ,002 ,692 ,132 
N 11 11 11 11 11 
fight 
Correlación de Pearson ,559 ,343 ,456 ,402 ,213 
Sig. (bilateral) ,074 ,301 ,159 ,221 ,529 
N 11 11 11 11 11 
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radical 
Correlación de Pearson ,748 ,463
**
 ,559 
Sig. (bilateral) ,008 ,151 ,074 
N 11 11 11 
extremist 
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**
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N 11 11 11 
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**
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**. La correlación es significativa al nivel 0,01 (bilateral). 
*. La correlación es significante al nivel 0,05 (bilateral). 
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terrorist 
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**
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**
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**. La correlación es significativa al nivel 0,01 (bilateral). 
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Nhardmeasures 
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N 11 11 
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Correlación de Pearson -,173 1 
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N 11 11 
 
 
 
 
